Panel Discussion 4 - Fake Elections and The Fight for The Revolution’s Future – Key Points

Mizzima

The following are the key points of the last of four panel discussions held at Thai PBS studio in Chiang Mai, Thailand on 28 December 2026 to mark the first phase of the Myanmar junta-run election.

4th Panel Discussion Key Points

Title: Fake Elections and The Fight for The Revolution’s Future

Moderator/Facilitator: Thet Swe Win, Executive Director, Synergy-Social Harmony Organization

Panelist: Nang Moet Moet, General Secretary, Women’s League of Burma (WLB)

Panelist: Sithu Maung, Member of Parliament, PABEDAN Constituency Rangoon, and Spokesperson of CRPH 

Panelist: Hnin Hnin Hmwe, Joint General Secretary- Democratic Party for A New Society (DPNS) 

The Junta’s Motives: Legitimacy and “Last Exit”

• The Recognition Trap: The panelists agree that the junta’s primary goal is to gain a veneer of political and legal legitimacy. Hnin Hnin Hmwe noted that because their state of emergency terms have expired, they are using the election as a “last exit” to manifest their continued existence, likely under pressure or advice from China.

• The 2008 Constitution Facade: Lway Mownt Noon emphasized that the military wants to send a “message” to the international community that the 2008 Constitution is still functional and that the country is “returning to normalcy,” despite the reality of nationwide crisis and violence.

• Reserve Positions: Sithu Maung revealed that the “election” results are pre-scripted. “Reserve positions” are already set for top generals (e.g., Mya Tun Oo, Aung Lin Dwe, and Min Aung Hlaing), ensuring the administrative structure remains a military dictatorship in civilian clothes.

Ma Hnin Hnin Hmwe, Associate General Secretary of the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS):

• A Strategy for Survival and Spurious Legitimacy: She argues that the junta is using the “fake election” as a desperate “last exit” to manufacture political and legal legitimacy after their state of emergency extensions expired. She notes that despite pressure from mentors like China to hold the vote, there is a massive gap between the military’s expectations and the reality of total public rejection.

• The “Same Old Trick” with No Public Mandate: She views the current process as a repeat of historical military tactics (like those in 1962, 1990, and 2010) designed to keep the military in power through a rigged Proportional Representation system and a biased Election Commission. She asserts that because the candidates lack qualifications and the public remains entirely disinterested – evidenced by the “silent, dry” atmosphere of the polls – the junta can never achieve a genuine public mandate.

• Unity through “Bottom-Up Federalism”: While acknowledging that revolutionary forces may have different internal views, she emphasizes that they are united by the common goal of removing the military.

• Unified Revolutionary Goals: She emphasizes that while revolutionary groups are diverse, they are firmly united on three non-negotiable pillars: the total removal of the military from politics, the complete abolition of the 2008 Constitution, and the establishment of a Federal Democratic Union.

• The Transitional Constitution: To replace the 2008 framework, she reveals that a Transitional Constitution is roughly 80% complete. This document is being designed through deliberation between various political and ethnic stakeholders to govern liberated areas and provide a legal roadmap for the transition period until a permanent federal constitution is ratified.

• Shift to “Bottom-Up” Federalism: She explains that the movement has moved past the military’s “scare tactics” about national disintegration. Instead, they are practicing “Bottom-up Federalism,” where local and ethnic territories exercise self-determination and join the Union by choice. She argues that any internal “differences” between revolutionary partners are secondary to their shared vision and are a natural part of a healthy democratic negotiation—unlike the irreconcilable conflict they have with the military “enemy.”

Ko Sithu Maung, acting as the spokesperson for the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), provides a strategic overview of the current conflict, defining the 2025 vote as a facade for an “Electoral Authoritarian Regime.

• The End of the “Textbook” Map: He argues that the traditional map of Myanmar no longer exists. By holding elections in “parts,” the military is publicly admitting they lack control over the sovereign territory of the State. He defines the current situation as one of “declining sovereignty,” where the military only controls limited, unstable pockets.

• “Electoral Authoritarianism” vs. Democracy: Drawing parallels to the Ne Win (BSPP) era, he explains that just because there is a parliament does not mean there is democracy. He asserts the junta is not holding the election to govern or provide public services, but to manufacture “legitimacy” for a single group and secure “reserve positions” for specific generals like Mya Tun Oo and Aung Lin Dwe.

• The Living Mandate of 2020: Ko Sithu Maung maintains that the 2020 election mandate remains valid as long as representatives continue to fight for “System Change” rather than personal power. He views this mandate as a legal tool used to abolish the 2008 Constitution and transition toward a new state-building phase.

• From Self-Rule to “Share-Rule”: He highlights that “Parallel States” already exist, with revolutionary forces providing public services in liberated areas. He challenges his fellow revolutionaries to move beyond individual “Self-Rule” and embrace “Share-Rule” – building a central authority even stronger than the current NUG to effectively implement a Federal Union.

• “They Shall Never Rule”: He concludes that nothing will fundamentally change in Myanmar’s administration after the election because the results are pre-determined. However, he reaffirms the revolution’s core slogan, “They shall never be allowed to rule,” emphasizing that the public only accepts administration based on the people’s will.

• Establish a Transitional Constitution: Move away from the abolished 2008 framework toward a shared federal foundation.

• Define the “Transitional Period”: He notes that a full transitional period can only be declared once the entire country is liberated, but the process of federal transition is already happening in controlled territories.

Nang Moet Moet, woman activist and General Secretary of the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), breaks down the military’s election strategy into these key points:

• A Facade of Legal Continuity: She argues the junta is holding these polls to trick the international community into believing the 2008 Constitution is still active and that the country is operating “normally” despite the ongoing civil war and crisis.

• The Trap of International Recognition: She warns that any foreign recognition or diplomatic engagement with this “fake election” acts as a “license” for the military to continue committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, which have intensified nationwide since 2021.

• Widespread Public Defiance: Despite military cruelty – including reported artillery and drone strikes near polling stations in places like Hlaing Tharyar – she highlights that the public is actively boycotting through silent strikes and mass street protests led by youth.

• Vision for a New System: She clarifies that the revolution is not about restoring 2020 results but about a total system change. This involves a “Bottom-Up” approach to building a Federal Democratic Union starting from strong, self-governing ethnic states.
• Critique of NUG “Phase 1” Reforms: She expresses deep concern over the National Unity Government’s recent restructuring, specifically the dissolving of the Ministry of Women, Youth and Children’s Affairs into a directorate. She labels this “scary” and a rollback of women’s leadership that must be corrected in “Phase 2.”

• The Power of Intersectionality: She highlights that the “Spring Revolution” has successfully united generations (Gen Z to elders) and diverse ethnicities. A major strength is the newfound public acknowledgment of the Rohingya genocide, signaling a shift toward mutual understanding and the rejection of all forms of oppression.

• Need for Unified Military Command: She warns that the proliferation of independent armed groups (PDFs) without a unified command system risks turning the revolution into a cycle of “political violence,” citing recent incidents of villagers being arrested and “informants” being killed without due process.

• A Non-Negotiable 30% Quota: Highlighting that women are the “backbone” of the revolution (leading the CDM and IDP aid), she asserts that a Federal Democratic Union cannot exist without meaningful inclusion. She calls for a mandatory 30% minimum participation quota for women in all decision-making leadership roles.

Dr. Bio (Vice-Chairman of the NLD – Yangon and a 2020 election winner) provides a systematic dismantling of the junta’s 2026 “fake election” through the lens of five specific failures of legitimacy.

 Maps

Here are the key points from his analysis:

The Five Pillars of Legitimacy Failure

1. Legal Legitimacy: A “war criminal gang” that seized power through treason (overturning a public government) has no legal standing to hold an election. Furthermore, the 2008 Constitution itself lacked public will from its inception.

2. Popular Consent: Public approval is non-existent. Dr. Bio contrasts the “silent and dry” streets of 2026 with the 2020 elections, where voters lined up all night despite COVID-19. He notes that among the millions of workers in Thailand, less than 10% participated in embassy voting.

3. Performance Legitimacy: The military cannot provide “utility.” They are unable to lift the economy, provide security, guarantee social equality, or manage basic administration. Dr. Bio suggests Myanmar is already a “Failed State” under their rule.

4. International Recognition: The global community has rejected the junta. The UN still recognizes the NLD-led government (President U Win Myint and Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun), and ASEAN has excluded the junta from meetings for years. Support from a few dictatorial allies does not equal international status.

5. Stability of Authority: Central power is unstable even in Naypyidaw. Internal mistrust within the military ensures they “won’t sleep well,” making the new government susceptible to an “implosion” at any time.

U Tun Kyi, a leading member of the Yangon Spring Platform and a former political prisoner, provides a raw, high-stakes assessment of the revolution’s current standing. His points focus on the dignity of the struggle, the suffering of the domestic public, and a blunt critique of revolutionary leadership.

Here are the key points from his analysis:

• “Dignity-less” Theatre: He describes the election as the “ugliest” and most “charity-less” event in Myanmar’s history. It is a “first part” designed solely to confirm and formalize military rule.

• Treason from the Start: He reminds the audience that the 2021 coup was not about “voter fraud” but about a personal desire for power. The junta committed treason from day one and has followed it with mass killings and crimes against humanity.

• Expansion of the “Military Sphere”: He warns that while 57 political parties are competing for “vacancies” in parliament, they are not gaining real political space. Instead, the “military sphere” is widening while the “political sphere” for the people is narrowing.

• The Math of the Trap: He breaks down the junta’s systematic path to victory: They already have 25% of seats via the constitution; the new Union Election Commission (UEC) rules are designed to give their proxy (USDP) the other 26% needed for a total majority.

• Stop the Hesitation: In politics, he argues, you cannot be hesitant for fear of being “hated.” He calls out the revolutionary forces for being too cautious in their self-criticism.

• Mandate Government Responsibility: He asserts that even though the public is doing its duty, the “revolutionary government” must actually be a revolutionary government. He emphasizes that their original purpose is “Winning the War.”

• Unity based on Principles: He explicitly rejects “opportunists’ unity.” He argues for unity built on a firm political framework and a strategic alliance that is essential to win the war.

• Territory is Not Victory: Using a military expert’s insight, he warns that “Liberating a territory is not a strategy.” True freedom only comes from “National Liberation” – the total dismantling of the military system across the entire country.

---

Final Synthesis: The Verdict of the 4th Panel

The fourth panel bridges the gap between fighting the war and building the state. The key takeaway is that the junta’s “civilian-clothed dictatorship” is a desperate rebranding that the public has already rejected. However, the revolution faces its own challenge: to move from a collection of “Strong States” to a unified “Federal Union” that values Gender Equality, Transitional Justice, and Shared-Rule.