A boycott can unite the opposition

Thursday, 08 April 2010 11:27 B.K. Sen

(Mizzima) - Burma has been plunged into a deep crisis, casting a cloud of uncertainty over the country’s first multiparty vote in more than 20 years. Squarely the military leaders have to be blamed. They have brutally seized power and it is their responsibility to return power to where it belongs - namely to the people. In 1990 they tried to show their commitment by holding elections, but refused to honor the results.
Nonetheless, under pressure from peoples’ movements and the international community, the regime entered into a facade of dialogue for peaceful transition to civilian rule. But after a lot of drama and gimmicks their true colors have been revealed. The junta still refuses to pay heed to the complaints that the opposition has been venting for years. Never have they entered into talks on the issue of elections. On the contrary, they have kept hundreds in jail as political prisoners, including the democratic icon Suu Kyi.

Arrogantly and contemptuously, the junta is proceeding with plans to hold its election under the widely condemned 2008 constitution. And now, to add insult to injury, the regime has passed electoral laws banning all activists who have served prison sentences from contesting the election. Deliberately, the junta has provoked the National League for Democracy to tighten the noose around its own neck by provoking an intra-party vote to keep the NLD out of the election.

To understand the lack of validity in the present constitution, we have to trace the country’s constitutional history. Previously, the electoral process and electoral laws were quite different and the stakeholders were political parties, not the military. Presently, the military is the lawgiver and king and can do no wrong.

History has shown that a number of authoritarian regimes collapsed while negotiating democratic reforms and through electoral competition. Some who were clever, however, redrew their political institutions along “formally” democratic lines ultimately against democratization. This is the case in Burma. When an authoritarian regime is in crisis it attempts “protracted” transition, managing the pace and trajectory of change by conducting limited electoral exercises. This happened in both Kenya and Mexico.

There are strong arguments in favor of Burma’s opposition boycotting the election. A critical prerequisite for a democratic election is a free environment; the keeping of over 2,000 political prisoners is in direct contradiction to this. Their release and ensuing declaration of amnesty is essential. Secondly, in order to create a level playing ground, the military cannot be a political party contesting the election. There must also be freedom of assembly, an independent media, independent election commission, independent election observers, equitable allocation of resources and an impartial judiciary.

None of the above criteria currently exist, thereby justifying a boycott. A boycott is a last option. It is a form of political protest in which voters feel the election system is biased; it is a peaceful political tool.

Declarations of various political parties and groups indicate that opposition to the electoral laws is widespread. The main opposition party, NLD, which won a landside victory in the 1990 election, declared that it is not taking part in the country’s 2010 election because of the unjust electoral laws. Leaders of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy have also declared their support for the NLD’s position. Meanwhile, the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), a coalition of 12 ethnic parties that won 67 seats in 1990, has also declared they will not participate in the election.

Further, several armed ceasefire groups continue to defy the junta’s call for them to transform their forces into a Border Guard Force. And internationally, leaders from the UN, USA, EU and ASEAN have criticized the electoral laws and expressed the view that the election cannot be free and fair. The overall picture is that the scheduled election has lost its credibility, and that a broad boycott deals a major blow to the legitimacy of the election while unifying opposition forces.

The question now arises, what is next after the boycott? The military has a stomach for a high level of bloodshed in confronting protests. Yet initiating social movements that hinder the regime’s ability to govern or minimize voter participation are the only alternatives. The deciding factor is the ingenuity of the opposition in spreading their arguments to voters who are the ultimate authority. The democratic potential of the people has thus far been unrealized. Faced with a national and global boycott, the junta will become more frustrated and desperate and stoop to all foul means available to prevent any renewed unrest. Repression is the only tool left in its hand. If repression is successful then authoritarian rule continues. But if it fails, concessions are given and democracy asserts itself.

Boycotts do carry an impact, but the final result depends on the interaction of different factors. The challenges are before both the junta and the opposition.