Flaws and challenges of EU policy on Burma

Monday, 02 August 2010 17:36 Javier Delgado Rivera

(Mizzima) – No credible international actor deems the forthcoming national elections in Burma as anything other than a mere act of pretence. Judging by the European Union’s (EU) latest statements on Burma, Brussels is no exception. Last February, the European Parliament (EP) concluded that under the present conditions, elections in Burma cannot be free or democratic. In this vein, the EP called on Naypyitaw to “take without delay the steps needed to ensure a free, fair, transparent and inclusive electoral process.”

The ultimate desire of the EU is to see a political transition in Burma in which a democratically elected civilian government takes over from the current repressive rule of the junta. In order to push the Burmese military to get this process underway, the EU has since 1996 opted to go down the road of renewing and strengthening restrictive measures against Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and its cronies.

The ruby success and the trade embargo spoilers

In reaction to restrictive election laws announced in March by the military regime, last April EU foreign affairs ministers extended by another year targeted measures against the junta. Sanctions are largely designed to curb the junta’s acquisition of military equipment and services, as well as to weaken business interests vital in fuelling the generals suffocating hold over the country. The restrictions include visa bans and asset freezes for key junta figures, their families, individuals associated with the generals, members of the judiciary and enterprises linked with the country’s top brass.

In particular, the EU’s ban on the import of Burmese gems regardless of where they are transformed, in conjunction with a similar U.S. initiative, has arguably prompted the closure of roughly 50 ruby mines. Although the true impact of this setback on Naypyitaw’s finances cannot be fully ascertained, Ivan Lewis, former British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, underlined that “the [mining] sector played a particular role in sustaining the military and their grip on power.”

The above may well embody the sole substantial payoff of the EU’s Common Position on Burma – the official designation of Brussels’ restrictions-based policy towards the estranged Southeast Asian country. In fact, for over 14 years EU sanctions have achieved little to nothing in terms of forcing Burma’s military dictatorship to open up. As an example, Piero Fassino, EU Special Envoy for Burma/Myanmar, has been unable to get permission to visit the country since his appointment in late 2007. In light of such plain disregard for the calls of the EU, chances are an EU request to send an exploratory mission to Burma in the build-up to the country’s elections remains likely to be ignored.

A further, and similar, example was the EU’s recent cancellation of a high-level visit to Burma after the junta rejected its petition to meet with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. If Burmese authorities do not even allow EU representatives to meet the detained Suu Kyi, there is not much hope that Naypyitaw will pave the way for Brussels to nose around in the run-up to voting, let alone on polling day.

As asserted by the European Parliamentary Caucasus on Burma, a grouping of Members of the European Parliament critical of perceived weak EU policies on Burma, “other EU measures, such as the decision to take away Burma’s Generalised System of Preference trade status (back in 1997), visa-bans and the freeze of some 70,000 Euros in assets, are more symbolic than effective.” Burma’s generals long ago transferred their assets to financial safe havens such as Switzerland or Liechtenstein – non-EU states. More importantly, the resulting lessened trade links between the EU and Burma have not hit the junta in any significant way, as the Burmese military is far from relying on European investment to drive and boost revenue. By trading and investing in Burma with little or no restraint, countries such as China, India, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore decisively spoil any EU intentions of debilitating the economic muscle of the military regime.

Aware of such a decisive hindrance to EU policy on Burma, last February the EP urged the governments of China, India and Russia “to use their economic and political leverage with the authorities of Burma/Myanmar.”

The EP call, however, proved to fall on deaf ears. In early June, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao went to Burma to meet Senior General Than Shwe and other leaders of the junta. On this official visit, Wen Jiabao signed a series of cooperation agreements with the dictatorship, deals devised to heavily invest in Burma’s natural resources. The EP’s plea went on to call on governments to “stop supplying the Burmese regime with weaponry and other strategic resources.” But the EU’s nonexistent leverage on China was evidenced once again when in mid-June Burma watchers brought out the news of a recent purchase of 50 Chinese fighter jets by the generals.

The EU will keep failing in its efforts to encourage substantial reforms in Burma unless key international and regional players agree on a common stance towards the repressive junta. As this does not seem likely to happen any time soon, if ever, the current EU line of promoting democracy in Burma is cursed to trip over the same stone again and again.

Perils and promises of policing out of the box

Nonetheless, the EU still has room to manoeuvre if it is to streamline its approach to Naypyitaw. As pointed out by Renaud Egreteau, Research Assistant Professor at Hong Kong’s Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, “one of the main flaws of the EU investment ban lies in its non-retroactivity.” This implies that all EU companies already investing in the country prior the 1996 launch of the EU Common Position on Burma are not affected by the ban. For instance, this allows French oil giant Total to keep on feeding Than Shwe’s dictatorship with massive revenues. The EU should look to bridge this gap, although Paris would certainly pull its weight to remove such a proposal from the table.

Given the poor performance of EU policy on Burma, European policymakers and officials would be better off if they seriously consider the revision of their Common Position. Yet, two paramount obstacles fly in the face of such a recipe. First of all, the EU does not really know what else can be done beyond regularly renewing its targeted sanctions and stating its exasperation towards the lack of compromise by the Burmese junta. Secondly, it may prove all too burdensome to come up with a rethought out policy on Burma and have the EU agree on it. The varying, and in some case competing, tones existing amongst the 27 EU member states would make any attempt to revitalise the European position on Burma an insurmountable challenge.

Regional alliances, certain flaws in EU policy on Burma and the complexity of the EU decision-making process are not alone in hindering the effectiveness of the European approach to Burma. Brussels must also realize that the junta sees no gain from giving in to EU appeals for democracy and human rights. As University of Canberra's Dr. Christopher Roberts rightly pointed at the June 24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, “the EU has not placed benchmarks for the removal if its sanctions.” If Brussels seeks to persuade the Burmese generals to listen up, it may at least contemplate the incorporation of some incentives in its sanctions-based policy.”

Any such carrots must aim to ease the repercussions that sanctions on trade and investment in Burma unfortunately do have on ordinary Burmese. Such incentives could come in the shape of a progressive launch of non-humanitarian aid and development programs, both currently suspended by the Council of the EU. The arrival of such aid may well entail the emergence of new business opportunities for a number of junta associates. This would in turn prompt the interest of the generals’ cronies in not allowing for the aid to be taken away, thereby unleashing a wave of opposition to the repealing of political gains.

Needles to say, EU incentives should only be entertained once the junta displays solid steps towards the irreversible democratisation of the country. However, regretfully, this is not what is happening in Burma in the run-up to this year’s general elections.