Burma: A practical recommendation for EU action

Tuesday, 03 August 2010 17:42 Mizzima News

Though I share the frustrations of Javier Delgado Rivera (Mizzima, 2 August) over European Union policy towards Burma and support his call for a revision of this policy, I see little prospect of success through promising incentives to Burma to democratise, but which can “only be entertained once the junta displays solid steps towards the irreversible democratisation of the country”. Why on earth should the regime bother, when the interface between Burma and the EU in trade, investment and tourism has been marginal now for so many years?

A brief look at the latest news shows all of Burma’s neighbours literally falling over each other to take a stake in exploiting Burma’s natural and human resources. The EU isn’t even on the sidelines – we are out of the stadium altogether.

An alternative immediate focus, not inconsistent with Mr. Rivera’s general approach which I commend, would be to institute a prompt and thorough technical review of EU sanctions, identify those that primarily affect the Burmese people and then unilaterally remove them at the earliest possible opportunity.

This could include such measures as: removing sanctions against named SMEs (small-to-medium-sized enterprises, family businesses) known to be supporters of the National League for Democracy and political reform and who were wrongly targeted in the now infamous Annex V of the EU’s 2008 sanctions simply because they were in sectors using wood, metals and precious stones in their products; restoring at least partial access to the EU Generalised System of Tariff Preferences (GSP) in order to support employment in private, non-crony sectors of the economy such as garment manufacturing which the state, military and cronies ignore because profits are so poor; and no longer discouraging travel and tourism to Burma, which provide employment to hundreds of thousands of ordinary Burmese and whose profits to the regime are marginal in comparison with revenues from gas sales. All the other sanctions that are properly targeted can stay for the present.

The suggestion that the EU should “bridge the gap” by seeking a retroactive ban on investment against the major oil and gas giant Total is seductive, but on closer examination, would seem to be an illusion. Even the sharpest critics of Total, EarthRights International (ERI), have made it clear that they are no longer pressing Total to leave Burma because its stake would only be taken over by an Asian competitor overnight.

More than that, Total’s social welfare and medical programmes (which ERI are pressing Total to expand as well as doing much more to counter human rights abuses in the vicinity of the pipeline) could suffer; Asian successors might be likely to pay less attention to environmental concerns; security on the pipeline would revert entirely to the Burmese Army, which would be very bad news for local residents; Total might need to pay a windfall to the regime of a very substantial sum in capital gains tax on exit; Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise would no doubt take a commercial fee on the transfer; and yet another restraining Western influence and presence in Burma would go. Cutting corners all-round, Asian successors would be likely to ensure that profits to the regime and to themselves were maximised. In any case, the gas is needed by Thailand, and represents 30 per cent of its total gas supplies. If this is shut off, Bangkok would suffer power cuts, Thai industry would be on short time and there could be more blood on the streets of Bangkok. Thai democracy has enough problems of its own without the EU adding to them.

The problem with the EU sanctions regime, as I feel sure Mr. Rivera would agree, is that it has developed over the years in a very haphazard way on a wave of emotion, generally in response to political pressures (the “something must be done” syndrome) that EC and national officials were powerless to withstand. EU ministers are now in a state of denial and do not want to hear that the sanctions they agreed in response to popular outrage at events in Burma are technically incompetent and have mostly hit the wrong targets. This would mean admitting that they got it seriously wrong – something that politicians anywhere in the world are loathe to admit at any time. EU isolation from Burma, though, is in danger of becoming petrified as its influence with Naypyidaw hovers close to zero.

The benefits resulting from a thorough-going technical review of EU sanctions and the prompt elimination of those that only or primarily hurt the Burmese people should be self-evident. It would send a strong signal to the regime that everything is open for negotiation, that the EU is genuinely concerned for the welfare of the people and that those sanctions which remain are negotiable, perhaps in the way that Mr. Rivera suggests. The change of guard likely to happen as a result of the forthcoming elections could provide an excellent opportunity for the EU to seek to re-establish its influence, provided it acts boldly and recognises where its best interests lie. This means less megaphone diplomacy and more practical action.

Derek Tonkin

Chairman Network Myanmar