India, the NLD and realpolitik

Monday, 09 August 2010 18:52 Joseph Ball

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Burmese Senior General Than Shwe’s recent state visit to India was depicted by many Burma observers and those committed to the restoration of democracy in Burma as further evidence of New Delhi shamefully reaching out to a brutal military dictatorship and ignoring India’s own storied democratic tradition.

As far as New Delhi is concerned however, since the mid-1990s the country’s best interests have been served in pursuit of its “Look East” policy, which seeks to benefit from Burma’s location and natural and human resources, while countering the growing influence of Beijing in the region. The policy has essentially placed promotion of democracy in Burma on the back-burner.

What happened? How has the world’s largest democracy become divorced from the 20-year struggle for democracy spearheaded by Aung San Suu Kyi?

While for Burma’s primary political opposition, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the question for Burma is very much one of democracy, it has never been the same for the Indian leadership. For New Delhi, it has always been a matter of power projection.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, a wave of democracy began to sweep across many parts of the world, if not in quality at least in quantity. According to rights think tank Freedom House, only 69 countries, or 41 per cent of all state governments, were democratic in nature in 1989. By 1995, this figure had skyrocketed to 115 countries, or 60 per cent of all governments.

Looking to further Indian national interests in cultivating relationships with Burma’s prospective power brokers, New Delhi extended a supportive hand to Burma’s embattled pro-democracy opposition, which in 1990 had emerged victorious in general elections.

However, tellingly, from 1995 to 2009 the percentage of democracies in the world remained unchanged. During the same period of time, New Delhi, as evidenced in the warm reception allotted the Burmese delegation – made up of at least 80 junta ministers, their wives and aides –during the course of their five-day visit last month, has consistently refrained from entering into political discourse in its relations with Naypyidaw.

Meanwhile, as part of a growing cultural exchange programme between India and Burma, New Delhi continues to expand assistance in educational opportunities for Burmese to study at Indian institutions – with a hopeful eye to grooming the future leadership of the country. Most of the transfer students are linked to or supported by the junta and the opportunities are most probably not open to truly democratic-minded Burmese. Acceptance of more Burmese scholars to study at Indian universities was agreed upon during last month’s exchange between Than Shwe and Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh.

The harsh lesson to be drawn is that Burma’s pro-democracy opposition, as epitomised by the NLD, failed to capitalise on its political prospects in an acceptable period of time. New Delhi, accordingly, reoriented itself away from a losing bet.

Opposition voices, however, are quick to point out that even with a reoriented foreign policy New Delhi consistently appears to lose out to Beijing in battles to secure investment inside Burma. Therefore, support for the country’s political opposition would enhance India’s status in future bilateral relations conducted between democratic neighbours.

But, the logic is faulty. India loses out to Chinese interests (and not always by any count, with annual trade approaching the US$1 billion mark) because of advantages inherent in the Sino-Burmese partnership. Such links include Burma’s north-south geographic orientation and deeper historical and cultural legacies lending themselves to less unfavourable social barriers.

Nonetheless, no matter the political orientation of Burma, if it is to benefit in development from its giant neighbours, it will necessarily have to remain significantly engaged with both New Delhi and Beijing. The former understands this, and knows that if need be it can always play the democracy card at a belated hour, confident that India will be broadly supported by North American and European leadership.

For Beijing, the de facto realisation of Burmese and Chinese shared interests is feared jeopardised by the effort expended by Burmese pro-democracy opposition elements in vilifying the present role of communist China in Burma. Even though the closing, in the most extreme case, of the north-south corridor linking China and Burma would retard pursuit of Burmese national interests, concern remains that a new Burmese leadership would opt to shame Beijing, resulting in a loss of existing and future Chinese investment in the Southeast Asian country.

New Delhi and Beijing, in short, are focused on Indian and Chinese interests, respectively. As such, both countries are willing to court whoever the power brokers are in Burma. The NLD, holding no political clout inside the country and now having opted to boycott elections at the close of the year, at present offers precious little incentive for major investors in Burma to court – especially for New Delhi, who need not fear a sudden democratic overhaul.

India’s Burma policy, though, is also wrongly envisioned. But it does not stumble on a question of democracy, at least not with respect to Burma. If New Delhi is to maximise its relationship with Naypyidaw, security and general conditions must improve in India’s northeast; and this is first and foremost an issue for Indian leadership to address. It is also a policy issue in which there are inherent contradictions, as development of the region could also pave the road of further Chinese encroachment.

India’s foreign policy agenda regarding Burma, while flawed, is not anti-democratic. Neither was it ever premised on pro-democratic leanings. The promotion of systems of government were and are instead tools to be used when convenient to further what is a pro-India agenda – or, possibly more accurately, a pro-New Delhi agenda.

In the period from the late 1980s to mid-1990s it was deemed appropriate to incorporate pro-democracy sentiments into India’s rhetoric of Burma policy with an aim to enhancing bilateral relations with the country’s prospective leadership. By the mid to late 1990s, however, the rhetoric changed with the realisation that the NLD was not an integral component of Burma’s power matrix – a point driven home by the party’s decision in late 1995 to withdraw from the (constitution-drafting) National Convention process.

What then could be done to bridge the rift between India and the NLD?

New Delhi would welcome a democratic transition in Burma, not least because it could potentially assist in countering China’s influence. However, India is only going to support players sitting at the table and active in tangible policy debate. The onus, thus, rests on the NLD to once again make itself politically relevant, beyond an ideological platform, to the overriding non-political interests of Indian leadership. And the present, negative agenda of relying on discredited elections looks to be a losing proposition, as New Delhi – in the absence of any viable alternative – would surely continue its present course.