The Tatmadaw and electoral repercussions

by Joseph Ball
Wednesday, 02 September 2009 15:15

Mizzima News - The 2010 Burma elections will not be free and fair. Neither are they likely to witness the full participation of an empowered National League for Democracy fronted by Aung San Suu Kyi. The military, following the balloting, will still hold a disproportionate share of political authority. In short, the elections will solidify and enshrine the military as the paramount political leaders of the Burmese state.

All the above are most likely correct and beyond redress…with the exception of the final point.

To assess the fallout from 2010, if elections do in fact occur, as merely a legitimating process – as all parties currently approach any prospective elections – ignores the complexities underlying the process, misappropriating the importance of the event to the population most greatly effected in the immediate future.

For two decades the discourse on Burmese political transformation has been dominated by the images and dreams of mass uprising – an undertaking featuring the civilian population wresting control of the government from a military regime with much blood on its hands. As such, the proposed 2010 elections are seen only in the shortcomings inherent in the process in meeting civilian aspirations and demands. However, this assumes a necessitated primacy of the civilian population regarding upcoming events, when it might be wiser to approach the elections for what it means to the armed forces – in effect conceding, for the moment, the military its starring role.

Nobody has forgotten the Army taking aim and shooting monks and civilians on the streets of Burma two years previously – least of all the military itself. An opposition stance and rhetoric commonly airing the dirty laundry of the Tatmadaw as a single institutional entity risks assisting in preserving a false unity within the ranks of the armed forces, convincing officers of the validity in maintaining institutional unity in the face of a vindictive civilian population. Yet, it is just at this critical juncture when questions may finally be asked of the officer corps submission to the pervading system of government.

In other words, the 2010 elections and the reintroduction of an electoral process will ask questions of the military. Having been uncalled upon to answer for so long, officers will come to be asked a forthright question in either supporting or subverting the existing system. A similar chronology and correlation was experienced in the Philippines following a period of direct martial law under the regime of Ferdinand Marcos. And though ‘people power’ would not descend upon Manila for another five years, it is not at all certain whether the masses would have won had not questions been asked of Filipino officers as a result of a skewed democratic process.

No, the anticipated actions of Tatmadaw officers should not be equated with jumping ship to the NLD and voting for Aung San Suu Kyi as Prime Minister. Rather, military personnel are to be asked a question in relation to political patrons as it pertains to both individual and institutional interests.

Ultimately, from the position of political dynamics and change, the fact that the Army opened fire on unarmed protesters – continuing with the analysis drawn from September 2007 – is not as crucial as the observation that the Army remained, to a high degree, unified.

If, then, the aspirations of the masses are to be realized through the advent of democratic reform, the unity of the armed forces needs to be broken down – not through defection but from within the ranks of the institution through a process of critical thinking. The 2010 elections and the changes presented – albeit not necessarily outwardly radical – do provide one such avenue through which this goal, and by default that of the democratic civilian opposition, can be realized.

To assist in achieving their aims in the run-up to 2010 and after, civilian activists and pro-democracy leaders should actively seek enhanced, working relationships with members of the military hierarchy while dramatically increasing the volume of information flow between the civilian opposition and armed forces.

The people need the Army, and the Army needs the people. Whoever among military and civilian leadership first recognizes and acts on this reciprocal relationship stands to win big in a post-2010 Burma. And from those within the ranks of the military, the advent of an electoral process – as flawed as it will be – can abet in both the realization of the need for, and attainment of, the support of the masses toward a prosperous, secure and democratic Burma.

Elections in 2010 by and of themselves are not going to change Burma. But the holding of elections and the resulting shift in political landscape could provide new avenues to be exploited by the country’s democratic opposition – as long as the Tatmadaw as an institution, under the guidance of a reformist officer corps, is approached and utilized as a valued party to the process.