Can an Arakan State Parliament Function Amid War and Parallel Governance?

Aung Marm Oo

The plan to convene an Arakan State Parliament in 2026 comes at a time when the  political and security landscape of Arakan is more fragmented than at any point in recent history. While the military regime has announced preparations for parliamentary sessions and a new state government, conditions on the ground raise serious questions about whether such an institution can function in any meaningful or representative way.

A state divided by control, not administration

Arakan State consists of 17 townships. At present, the Arakan Army (AA) controls 14 of them. In these areas, civilian life is largely administered through structures established by the United League of Arakan (ULA) under the People’s Government of Arakan (PGA). These structures include local administration, education systems, healthcare delivery, policing, and judicial mechanisms.

This has created a parallel governance reality. For many communities, the PGA not the military-appointed state government is the authority they interact with on a daily basis. Schools operate outside the junta system, clinics function under local oversight, and disputes are resolved through non-state courts. This governance has emerged not through elections, but through territorial control, local legitimacy, and necessity amid prolonged conflict.

The proposed Arakan State Parliament, however, is being constructed as if this reality does not exist.

Elections without statewide participation

The recent elections underpinning the proposed parliament were held in only three townships, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung and even there, voting was incomplete. According to official figures, just over 100,000 people voted in a state with a population exceeding 3.1 million.

Large areas were excluded entirely due to conflict and lack of regime control. Rather than postponing or rethinking the process, the military regime relied on a combination of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems to allocate parliamentary seats to townships where no ballots were cast.

As a result, MPs have been assigned to represent areas they cannot physically access and populations that did not vote for them.

Renewed clashes underscore the security gap

Recent armed clashes in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe, two towns central to the election narrative have further underlined the fragility of the security environment. These incidents demonstrate that even in areas nominally under regime control, stability remains elusive.

This has direct implications for parliamentary governance. Legislators are expected to engage with constituents, conduct field visits, and respond to local concerns. In active conflict zones, such basic functions become impossible. Parliamentary work risks being confined to meeting halls, disconnected from realities beyond them.

Representation versus administration

The core issue is not merely legality, but relevance.

A parliament derives legitimacy from representation. Representation, in turn, presupposes participation, access, and accountability. In Arakan, most people neither voted in the election nor live under the administrative authority of the system proposing to represent them.

At the same time, governance is already taking place through non-parliamentary means. The PGA administers daily life across much of the state, while the military regime seeks to establish a parliament whose authority does not extend into those same areas.

This creates a structural contradiction:

  • Governance exists without parliamentary representation, and
  • Parliamentary representation exists without governance authority.

A reduced parliament with increased military influence

Under the new arrangement, the Arakan State Parliament is expected to have 33 seats, including 12 military appointees. This is a significant reduction from the previous 47-seat structure and increases the relative weight of the military bloc.

Combined with seats held by the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), this configuration allows the regime to control key decisions, including the selection of the Chief Minister and parliamentary leadership, regardless of broader public opinion.

What kind of parliament is possible?

The emerging Arakan State Parliament appears likely to function as an administrative and symbolic body, rather than as a forum for political negotiation or genuine public representation. Its authority will be limited geographically, politically, and socially.

Meanwhile, the deeper political question how Arakan should be governed, and by whom  remains unresolved. The existence of parallel governance under the PGA suggests that any long-term  political settlement will require engagement with realities beyond formal parliamentary structures.

Conclusion

In the current context of armed conflict, fragmented authority, and parallel administration, the proposed Arakan State Parliament faces fundamental constraints. Without broad participation, territorial access, and public consent, it risks becoming an institution detached from the society it claims to represent.

Whether such a parliament can evolve into a meaningful political body will depend not on electoral formulas, but on changes in security conditions, governance arrangements, and inclusive political dialogue. Until then, Arakan’s political future is likely to continue being shaped more by events on the ground than by proceedings inside a parliamentary chamber.

Aung Marm Oo is the Editor-in-Chief and Executive Director of Development Media Group (DMG), a news agency based in Arakan (Rakhine) State. He faces charges under Myanmar’s Unlawful Associations Act and has been in hiding since May 2019.

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