James Shwe
Since retiring as U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Yangon in January 2026, Susan Stevenson has emerged as an influential voice calling for expanded American commercial engagement with Myanmar. In a February interview on Mizzima’s Asia Forward program, she argued that “the United States doesn’t actually want American companies to leave,” characterized early post-coup sanctions as “scattershot,” and encouraged U.S. firms to position themselves for growth as the post-election government takes shape. Her central message was that American businesses should stay, expand, and compete with China.
These are arguments that deserve serious engagement, not dismissal. Stevenson served with distinction during an extraordinarily difficult posting, and her firsthand experience of Myanmar’s operating environment carries weight. But the implications of her advocacy — particularly in the current political moment — require careful examination.
A Pattern That Warrants Attention
It is worth noting the broader context in which Stevenson’s media advocacy has emerged. Her first major interview upon returning to the United States was hosted by Asia Forward, a program whose host, Ei Thant Sin, is a respected Myanmar-born journalist. Ms. Ei Thant Sin’s spouse, Jack Myint, serves as Head of Communications, Public Affairs, and Research Director for Mainland Southeast Asia at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council — the same organization that has long facilitated American business engagement with Myanmar. While there is nothing improper about this connection, and Ms. Ei Thant Sin’s journalism stands on its own merits, the Myanmar diaspora community has noted that the interview’s framing leaned heavily toward business opportunity rather than the human rights and accountability concerns that dominate their daily experience of the crisis.
This pattern extends beyond a single interview. In July 2025, Adam Castillo — the former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar — visited the White House and pitched Vice President Vance’s advisors on a proposal to broker a deal with the military junta for access to Myanmar’s rare earth minerals. As both the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Pulitzer Center have documented, Castillo urged the administration to seek an accommodation with the junta leadership, even though the rare earth mining areas are controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization, not the military. CSIS analyst Gregory Poling warned that such outreach would amount to “a big bet on the losing side of the civil war” and would “tie the United States’ hopes to a Chinese proxy regime.”
These are not isolated incidents. They reflect an emerging pattern in which former officials and business figures with Myanmar ties — whatever their individual motivations — are collectively constructing a narrative of normalization. The Myanmar community in the United States is watching this trajectory with deep concern, not because we oppose American engagement, but because we understand how the junta will use it.
Understanding What Sanctions Are For
A persistent thread in the engagement narrative is the suggestion that sanctions have failed to topple the junta and should therefore be reconsidered. This reflects a misunderstanding of their purpose. Sanctions are, first and foremost, a normative instrument. They uphold international human rights standards, signal that certain conduct carries consequences, and deny legitimacy to those who violate those norms. They are not primarily designed as a mechanism for regime change — though they may contribute to broader pressure over time. Any experienced policymaker understands this distinction.
The sanctions currently in place against Myanmar’s military enterprises — the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, the Myanmar Economic Bank, and the jet fuel supply chains that enable airstrikes against civilians — exist because those entities finance atrocities. The BRAVE Burma Act proposes to strengthen these targeted measures while directing the U.S. Treasury to block the junta’s access to IMF borrowing. These are precision instruments aimed at the military’s revenue arteries, and they represent the floor, not the ceiling, of what the international community can and should do for the people of Myanmar and preserving a rule-based world order.
Trade Should Continue — Within Boundaries
Let us be clear about what this argument is not. The United States cannot and should not refrain from all commerce with Myanmar. Trade in goods and services that fall outside the scope of sanctions — agriculture, consumer products, telecommunications, civilian technology — can and does benefit ordinary Myanmar citizens. No one gains from an economic blockade that punishes the very people the policy aims to protect.
But there is a meaningful difference between permissible trade and indiscriminate commercial promotion. When a former senior diplomat encourages American business engagement without equally emphasizing the structural obstacles to ethical operation in a junta-controlled economy, the message — however well-intentioned — risks serving purposes beyond its stated aim.
The Structural Problem: Who Benefits?
The difficult truth is that U.S. businesses operating in junta-controlled Myanmar today face a system that is structurally incapable of delivering broad public benefit. The junta controls the banking system, sets the exchange rate, and mandates that foreign currency earnings flow through military-linked financial institutions. The Central Bank of Myanmar directs up to 75 percent of trade-earned foreign currency toward the regime’s priority imports — fuel and edible oil — rather than toward wages, public services, or economic development. Rule of law has collapsed. Independent trade unions have been outlawed. Workers who organize face arrest.
In this environment, American firms — however strong their labor standards and corporate values — cannot simply replicate the conditions they would create in a functioning market economy. They operate within structures the military controls. As IndustriALL Global Union observed in February 2026, Myanmar is no longer “a high-risk sourcing destination” but rather “a war economy.”
The Legitimacy Question
Here is the trajectory that concerns us most. No country — including the United States — is rushing to invest in Myanmar right now, because the environment is simply not conducive to business by any rational assessment: currency controls, capital flight risks, a workforce depleted by migration and forced conscription, and an active civil war.
Stevenson’s advocacy, therefore, achieves something other than what it may intend. It provides the post-election government — installed through a process that the United Nations, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have condemned as deeply flawed — with something it desperately needs: the appearance of international normalization. The Council on Foreign Relations has warned that the White House may ease sanctions so that “American natural resources companies can compete there with Chinese and other firms.”
If that perception takes hold — “even the Americans are doing business with us” — the consequences extend well beyond commerce:
- Pressure to relax sanctions increases if American firms are visibly present.
- A government perceived as “legitimate” may seek and receive military training, equipment, or intelligence cooperation.
- International financial institutions find it harder to justify restricting lending to a country where the world’s largest economy does business.
- ASEAN partners already eager to re-engage gain the political cover to fully normalize relations.
The real risk is not that a few American companies will employ a few thousand workers. It is that their presence will be used to dismantle the very accountability mechanisms that Congress is trying to build.
Strengthening the BRAVE Burma Act’s Special Envoy
We are deeply grateful to Senator McConnell and the bill’s cosponsors — Senators Merkley, Van Hollen, and Young — for introducing the BRAVE Burma Act and for their bipartisan commitment to the people of Burma. The Act’s establishment of a Special Envoy with ambassadorial rank, responsible for coordinating sanctions, diplomacy, and humanitarian engagement, is a critical and welcome step.
At the same time, many in our community respectfully believe that the envoy provisions could be strengthened. Our experience with various UN and ASEAN envoys to Myanmar has, at times, been disappointing — marked by limited transparency, perceived conflicts of interest, and insufficient engagement with the full range of Burma’s pro-democracy forces. We are anxious not to see those patterns replicated in a new U.S. structure.
Because the Special Envoy will play a central role in shaping America’s approach to one of the world’s most consequential humanitarian crises, we respectfully suggest that the Senate consider strengthening safeguards in several areas as the bill moves forward: enhanced financial disclosure and clear conflict-of-interest provisions; defined parameters for the envoy’s coordinating authority; regular and detailed reporting to Congress; a statutory requirement for structured consultation with Burma’s diverse pro-democracy stakeholders — including the NUG, the CRPH, ethnic resistance organizations, and civil society; and provision for periodic independent review.
These suggestions are offered in a spirit of partnership. Our goal is to help ensure that the envoy’s office commands the trust and credibility it will need to be effective — among the people of Burma, within the U.S. government, and across the international community.
Conclusion: Engagement With Discipline
The United States should remain engaged with Myanmar’s people. It should facilitate trade that is not prohibited by sanctions, support civil society, and maintain a presence that does not enrich the military or lend legitimacy to its rule. This is not a call for disengagement — it is a call for disciplined engagement.
The arguments for expanded commercial activity deserve a hearing. But they must be weighed against the structural realities of Myanmar’s economy today, the normative purpose of sanctions, and the very real risk that commercial advocacy — regardless of intent — provides the junta with something it cannot earn on the battlefield: the appearance of international acceptance.
The people of Myanmar have endured five years of extraordinary sacrifice for a democratic future. American policy should reflect the weight of that struggle.
James Shwe is a semi-retired consulting engineer and democracy advocate based in California, USA. He writes regularly on Myanmar policy for international publications.
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