Weaponising the Trawl: China’s Maritime Militia, Distant-Water Fishing, and the Strategic Contest in the Indian Ocean

Sun Lee

As the international order faces simultaneous stress from geopolitical rivalry and climate-induced resource scarcity, China’s behaviour in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) reflects a familiar and troubling pattern. Under the guise of civilian economic activity, Beijing is extending its maritime footprint through heavily subsidised distant-water fishing fleets that operate in close coordination with state and military institutions. What appears on the surface as fishing is, in practice, a grey-zone strategy, blending economic exploitation, intelligence gathering, and coercive presence to reshape maritime realities without triggering open conflict. The Indian Ocean is now emerging as the next testing ground for this model.

China has been struggling to maintain food and economic security, which has led it to expand its fishing operations beyond the South and East China Seas and far into the Indian Ocean. Its large ‘civilian’ distant-water fishing (DWF) fleets, affiliated to varying degrees with Chinese government agencies, are militarily trained, and seen as China extending its maritime power – challenging international rules and using non-traditional maritime forces.

The DWF have been subject to growing international scrutiny for environmental destruction (overfishing, ecosystem damage, shark finning), human rights abuses (forced labour, violence, debt bondage on vessels), and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. China’s claims of responsible behaviour stand in stark contrast to a documented pattern of deception, coercion, and rule evasion.

India will soon have to tackle a swarm of these fisherman fleets in its backyard, used for reconnaissance, swarming, and logistics in the region. These fleets are state-directed tools of maritime revisionism, not incidental overcapacity. China has weaponised its massive fishing fleet to stay under the radar and achieve its goals without escalation or bloodshed. Additionally, China also presents a massive normative threat in an already dismantling world order. While it seems keen on pushing the code of conduct in the South China Sea (SCS), its maritime militia undermines UNCLOS, hollowing out the maritime governance and setting a precedent that rewards coercion over compliance.

China adopted the military-civil fusion strategy to make the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world-class military” force by 2049. This was a state-led, state-directed programme with the primary role of leveraging the state and commercial power to strengthen the PLA and national security. The belligerent spirit of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia is well-documented, and a procedure and pattern to this approach are evident.

China defines its militia as “an armed mass organisation composed of civilians retaining their regular jobs,” a component of China’s armed forces, and an “auxiliary and reserve force” of the PLA. Under this modus operandi, People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) became the prime example of civil-military fusion, using civilian fishing vessels to assert territorial claims, gather intelligence, and harass other stakeholders, blending civilian fishing with military-style duties under PLA direction to achieve strategic goals without direct conflict. As per a 2016 report by the Ministry of National Defence (MND), the regulation outlined the PAFMM as a component of China’s “People’s Armed Forces System,” dual-hatted under civil-military command.

PAFMM operates under the dual leadership of the State Council and Central Military Commission (CMC), with local National Defence Mobilisation Commissions (NDMCs) at provincial/municipal levels managing recruitment, training, and mobilisation. Key provisions include: a) Formation of “professional detachments” from fishing fleets for naval support, surveillance, logistics, and sovereignty enforcement; b) Training mandates: one-week sessions on advanced navigation, communications (Beidou), and coordination with PLAN/Coast Guard; c) Subsidies for equipped vessels (radar, satcom) to ensure rapid activation during incidents.

Training: Fishermen receive subsidised training from provincial governments and the PLA Navy, covering one-week sessions on vessels costing over 100,000 RMB, to perform tasks including but not limited to border patrol, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary functions in support of naval operations in wartime. Units are equipped with advanced electronics such as radar, satellite communication, and Beidou navigation for interoperability.

Strategy: The reasoning behind the use of non-traditional alternate force is to escape confrontation or escalation in the absence of a direct military involvement. The militia asserts sovereignty through “floating presence” in disputed waters, enabling grey-zone tactics like swarming foreign vessels while maintaining plausible deniability as civilians. It fills intelligence “blind spots” for the PLA, supports logistics, reclamation, and anti-access missions without escalating to open conflict. Beijing subsidises fleets to project power beyond the First Island Chain.

Patterns and Targets: The pattern suggests that operations involve massed fleets, hundreds swarming reefs like Scarborough Shoal or Senkaku, harassing patrols, shadowing ships, and protecting illegal fishing. Targets include rival claimants (Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and recently, IOR). Recent drills show coordinated blockades with thousands of boats. As per a recent report in January 2026, thousands of Chinese fishing boats quietly formed a vast sea barrier in the East China Sea. Notably, 1,400 and 2,000 fishing boats, in a period of two weeks, swarmed the region, ‘forming massive floating barriers of at least 200 miles long,’ showing a new level of coordination and operational skills.

Indian Ocean Region Challenge

Similar patterns are underplaying in the IOR, causing deep concerns for Indian maritime security. Chinese fishing fleets maintain a massive presence in the IOR, with activities intensifying around India despite crackdowns, driven by SCS overfishing and strategic expansion. Latest data shows surges in high-risk vessels, IUU incidents, and dual-use ops near Indian EEZs, monitored closely by the Indian Navy.

Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania lost up to USD 142.8 million annually between 2015 and 2021 to illegal fishing of shrimp and tuna. Coastal states like Pakistan, China’s “all-weather friend”, have formally raised concerns regarding the illegal use of deep-sea trawlers, depleting fish stocks and damage to the ecology. Reportedly, in 2023, the annual economic losses from IUU fishing in the region exceeded USD 5 billion. The assessment of Chinese actions was summarised as small-scale fishermen, unable to compete with heavily subsidised Chinese fleets, are caught between two choices: either abandon traditional fishing grounds or endure significant income losses.

The patterns suggest that the Chinese focus has intensified in the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, and Andaman EEZ. Around 450 vessels entered the IOR sectors in 2020, but 2025 marked an escalation in Chinese presence in the waters near India. India monitored research vessels like Xiang Yang Hong 01 anchored west of Andamans (March 2025), testing Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) and another vessel in “dark mode” (AIS off) 120 NM off EEZ for seafloor/acoustic surveys. In 2025, fishing trawlers shadowed military exercises, encroached on Andaman-Nicobar (572 islands, many uninhabited), and fish nocturnally via the Coco channels. The Indian Navy confirmed that it is tracking “each & every” vessel, and took precautionary action of cancelling BrahMos tests amid incursions to prevent real-time data interception of sensitive weapon systems. In 2025, three research vessels – Shi Yan 6, Shen Hai Yi Hao, and Lan Hai 201 were seen in the Indian waters. What China is exporting to the Indian Ocean is not fishing capacity, but a tested model of maritime coercion, refined in the South China Sea and now adapted for a new theatre.

Therefore, China’s growing use of fishing fleets and maritime militia in the Indian Ocean is not an isolated challenge but part of a deliberate strategy to normalise coercive presence and erode maritime norms. By weaponising civilian vessels and exploiting legal ambiguity, Beijing is exporting instability, environmental degradation, and strategic pressure into a region vital to regional security. This represents a direct maritime threat to the IOR rather than a peripheral fisheries issue.

Sun Lee is the pseudonym of a writer who covers Asia and geopolitical affairs.