Investigation of Xi’s No. 2 Among Top Generals Signals Deep Fault Lines in China’s Military-Party System

Sun Lee

China’s decision to place two of its top military leaders under investigation marks a rare and destabilising moment for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control over the armed forces, raising questions about the regime’s cohesion and the durability of Xi Jinping’s centralised authority.

In a brief statement issued on January 24, China’s defence ministry announced that Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, a CMC member and chief of its Joint Staff Department, were under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.” No further details were provided, a familiar feature of politically sensitive cases within China’s opaque disciplinary system.

Zhang’s case is especially consequential. As the CMC’s second-ranked official after Xi, he is the highest-ranking uniformed officer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the CCP Politburo, the party’s core decision-making body. Any confirmed removal would represent a major rupture at the very top of China’s military command structure.

The defence ministry said the decision followed an inquiry by the Party Central Committee, underscoring that the move is political as much as disciplinary. In China’s system, where the party exercises absolute control over the military, investigations of this nature rarely proceed without the top leadership’s explicit approval.

If confirmed, Zhang’s downfall would mark the first time since 1989 that two Politburo members have been removed during a single five-year term, according to a source close to senior military circles. The current Politburo began its term in late 2022 with 24 members. One vacancy was already created by the fall of He Weidong, previously the PLA’s second-most senior uniformed officer and widely seen as a trusted ally of Xi.

He and eight other senior officers were expelled last October over what authorities described as grave violations of party discipline and large-scale corruption. At the time, the defence ministry pointed to “extremely large amounts of money” involved, a phrase often used to signal both financial wrongdoing and political disloyalty.

Together, the cases suggest a near-systemic purge of the CMC established after the 20th Party Congress. With Zhang and Liu sidelined, Zhang Shengmin, the PLA’s top disciplinary official, remains the only uniformed officer still standing on the seven-member commission. His elevation to CMC deputy chairman last October further highlights the growing dominance of internal control mechanisms over operational military leadership.

The scale and persistence of the purges since 2023 are striking. Senior officers from across the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force and People’s Armed Police have been removed, alongside commanders from key theatre commands, including those responsible for Taiwan contingencies. Parallel investigations have swept through China’s defence industrial base, ensnaring executives linked to advanced weapons programmes, including aircraft carrier and stealth fighter production.

While Xi has framed the campaign as a necessary assault on corruption, the breadth of the crackdown points to deeper political tensions. Analysts note that prolonged purges at the elite level risk undermining institutional trust, morale and command continuity within the PLA, precisely at a time when Beijing faces mounting external and internal pressures.

Those pressures extend beyond the military. China’s leadership is contending with persistent economic headwinds, including high youth unemployment, ballooning local government debt, an ageing population and a prolonged property downturn that has eroded household wealth. Against this backdrop, sustained instability within the party’s core power centres carries wider implications.

As one analyst put it, the party’s four pillars of control, the gun, the purse, the sword and the pen, are all under strain. Continued factional infighting at the top, they argue, could pose a direct challenge to CCP rule itself, particularly if loyalty within the military becomes suspect.

Zhang and Liu are not marginal figures. Both are decorated veterans and the only members of the current CMC with combat experience, having participated in PLA operations against Vietnam in the late 1970s. Zhang, now 75, has been central to Xi’s military reform agenda since 2012, playing a key role in restructuring the PLA and advancing its modernisation drive.

His career trajectory, from senior roles in the People’s Armed Police to leadership positions in the restructured Ground Force and the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, reflects the trust he once enjoyed at the highest level. That such a figure is now under investigation underscores the depth of the upheaval within China’s military-political elite.

With the PLA approaching its 99th anniversary later this year, the near-total dismantling of its top command raises uncomfortable questions for Beijing. Whether the purges ultimately consolidate Xi’s control or expose fault lines that weaken the system he has built remains one of the most consequential uncertainties facing China today.

Sun Lee is a pseudonym for a writer who covers Asia and geopolitical affairs.