Burma’s election: Why should the people engage?

Thursday, 21 October 2010 12:35 Salai Andrew Ngun Cung Lian & Salai Za Ceu Lian

(Mizzima) – Burma’s ruling military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), consistently trumpets its adherence to a “seven-step roadmap to a flourishing democracy.” However, detractors believe that this roadmap merely perpetuates the aim of legitimizing military rule. Nevertheless, in accord with its self-imposed obligation the SPDC has set an election date of November 7, 2010. This has set off a heated debate among democratic opposition leaders and activists as well as international and regional stakeholders over whether or not Burma’s people should participate in the election.

Among advocates of democracy there are those who cautiously support the idea of an election and those who do not. Those who oppose the upcoming general election argue that participating in the election endorses the 2008 constitution, drafted over the course of fourteen years by the military regime’s handpicked legal experts. Most detractors view the constitution as purely an attempt at perpetuating military rule. On the other hand, there are those who cautiously support the general election, viewing it as one step among many leading to the eventual restoration of democracy for Burma. These cautious supporters acknowledge the failure of the democratic opposition to impede the military regime from pursuing its declared political objectives, including the seven-step roadmap to democracy. Regardless of what position one takes, both camps have a shared interest and a common destiny: they abhor the military dictatorship and yearn for democratic reform in Burma.

As we pursue our shared goal of democratizing Burma, whether we are native Burmese or friends in the international community, it is imperative that we come up with workable ideas and adopt a realistic approach that will gradually but surely lead Burma to full-fledged democracy. As we have witnessed over the 20 years following the 1988 people’s uprising, our grand strategy of pressuring the military regime to democratize through unilateral sanctions, isolationism and political statements is ineffective. A realistic approach involves pursuing incremental change by employing conditional engagement, applying internal force with the support of external forces. Knowing that democratic reform inside Burma must come from within, we must support the use of multi-pronged pressure, but especially from inside Burma. Therefore, we believe that the upcoming election is one of many avenues through which people inside can assert pressure on the military government.

Prospective elected Members of Parliament for State, Division, and Union legislatures who embrace our strategy of gradual change can assert pressure on the military government toward the advent of democratic ideals and practices. In the days ahead, raising objection to the initiatives of the military regime without providing alternatives relevant to the changing political condition inside Burma would reduce the efforts of the democratic opposition to merely symbolic in gesture. This is not, however, to dismiss the fact that the military regime will of course do whatever it can to safeguard its own interests and benefits. The 2008 constitution reflects the military’s commitment to entrenching and defending military rule. In each of the four legislatures, 25 percent of seats are reserved for the military. Furthermore, the constitution also stipulates the heads of all the most powerful governmental departments will be filled by people with a military background. And even worse, any amendment to the constitution has to be approved by more than 75 percent of legislators. Thus, in practical terms, any future constitutional amendment demands the support of the army. The entrenchment of military rule through the constitution once again demonstrates that in any constitution reflects the will of dominant group.

We concede that we cannot stop the military government from pursuing its goals. However, we are encouraged by the fact that the 2008 constitution will be abrogated once we have a full-fledged democracy. Our own historical experience of the abrogation of past constitutions attests to this: the Government of Burma Act, 1935; the Union of Burma (1948); and the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma all ceased to exist with the changing of governments. Similarly, the 2008 constitution will sooner or later be retired to the dustbin of history. Therefore, we urge fellow democratic forces not to get bogged down in opposing the 2008 constitution just for the sake of opposing it, but rather focus on fine tuning and re-strategizing the role of the opposition following the 2010 election.

In formulating a future strategy for our democratic movement we strongly suggest that incremental change is the most workable approach to realistically lead Burma to full-fledged democracy. Let’s reflect on reasons why we should adopt this approach.

Thus far, attempts to isolate the military regime through sanctions have not been effective. Sanctions without the support of regional powers such as China, India, Japan and Asean have only a symbolic effect on the military government. In contrast, regarding the experience of South Africa, UN-imposed sanctions against the Apartheid regime were widely supported by the international community. Burma’s opposition, however, has failed miserably in achieving a common position at the international level, making international sanctions against Burma impossible. Driven by their own national interests, we can reasonably predict that regional actors such as China, India and Asean countries will not join the call for sanctions among Western nations. As such, we support the conditional engagement policy of the Obama administration. By calling for conditional engagement we believe that all international actors can maximize their opportunity to pressure the military government from inside rather than outside. Ultimately, this gives us a better chance of achieving the outcome that we have long sought – the restoration of democracy.

As noted already, we have to embrace the concept that real change in Burma will come from within. That includes a people's uprising, the same kind of movement that has brought down authoritarian regimes in many countries. However, we have twice seen such an uprising in Burma in which many innocent lives were sacrificed, in both 1988 and 2007. In both instances a lack of competent opposition leadership contributed toward the failure of the demonstrations. Now, after again witnessing the brutality of the military government in violently cracking down on protesters, people inside Burma are more frightened than ever. It is becoming harder to envision another nationwide protest within a country that has one of the largest armies in Southeast Asia. Further, the massive military build-up over recent years demonstrates that overthrowing the military regime through armed struggle is out of question.

External pressure without engagement and internal pressure is, therefore, no longer adequate. We need to focus on changing the political culture inside Burma by recruiting and maximizing forces operating inside the country. The goal would be to establish a political platform conducive to introducing a democratic culture and practices where the ruling and opposition parties can start engaging with each other through non-violent means. Believing that the middle class can act as a major agent of change for eventual democratic reform, we call for ways that will open up the economy conducive to the rise of middle class. Subsequently, this middle class will demand not only good and responsible government upholding the supremacy of law, but will also want a right to have a say in who should govern.

Furthermore, it is advisable for Burma-watchers to come to terms with the lack of democratic traditions in the country, which have been almost non-existent in the country’s political culture since achieving independence in 1948. Throughout the annals of modern Burma, an authoritarian culture and tradition of tyranny of the majority has endured, whether under a democratic government or successive dictatorial juntas.

Our analysis of the parliamentary democracy era from 1948 to 1962 has exhibited that working relations between the dominant ruling party, Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), and opposition parties were characterized by an atmosphere of non-cooperation, non-compromise and non-engagement. Almost all bills introduced during this time by the ruling party were opposed by the opposition, and vice-versa. Then, from 1962 to 1988 Burma was ruled by the military dictator Ne Win, whose government was eventually buttressed by the advent of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and the promulgation of the 1974 constitution, which enshrined single-party rule. Since 1988, the SPDC has held the reigns of power.

However, unlike the BSPP constitution of 1974 the current constitution allows for limited room to manoeuvre inside the legislatures. Though admittedly, we do not know how much opposition members will be able to advance opposing views and alter the democratic concept as presently enshrined in the military mindset. But, one thing is certain in a post-2010 election Burma, for the first time in 48 years military representatives and elected legislators will be sitting together in a bid to govern.

It is no secret that the military regime has taken and will continue to take coercive actions in regard to the polling. To retain political domination we understand that the SPDC and the Union Solidarity Develop Party (USDP) will employ various tactics to distort the electoral result. Like many of Burma's election watchers we are concerned over the fact that the military government has shown no sign of accepting international election observers. On the other hand, we also foresee that, given the high stakes of tarnishing their credibility and reputation, international observer teams might be disinclined to monitor Burma’s election so as to avoid being seen as endorsing a rigged election. But, there is still action that can be taken. For example, political parties taking part in the election should submit a formal written appeal to the Union Election Commission, requesting the formation of an election observer team that is independent, impartial and non-partisan.

The establishment of such an election monitoring team, be it domestic or international, should ensure that the electoral process is free and fair. Moreover, separate from requesting the introduction of an election observer team for the Union Election Commission, all candidates and parties who register to participate in the election should also form an informal self-monitoring election group, charged with the responsibility to both closely monitor the electoral process and provide voter education. Political parties and candidates, nevertheless, should also prepare to challenge cases of irregularity and fraudulent activities with the Union Election Commission.

In the Kingdom of Thailand there is a political joke saying, “If you don’t vote, don’t complain for four years.” The people inside Burma should exercise their democratic right to make an informed choice by voting for candidates of their choosing. Simultaneously, candidates should prepare to establish a new democratic political culture that will promote democratic practices now extinct in Burma for nearly half a century.