Competition and bribery at Burma’s National Defence College

by Bo Htet Min
Friday, 13 November 2009 12:00

Mizzima News - After 1993, the then prevailing situation forced officers to attend the National Defence College (NDC) to be promoted to top echelon posts – defined as those above the level of Regional Command Commanders. The first NDC intake incorporating this line of thinking occurred on 20 March 1994, comprising 31 trainees and eventually realizing a 30 percent success rate in the development of commanders placed to top echelon postings. But apart from serving as the training grounds for a professional officer corps, the NDC finds itself mired in competition for an inadequate number of postings – producing a situation ripe for the institutionalization of corruption.

Originally, those who secured a position from 1st to 5th in their respective intakes were directly promoted to Light Infantry Division (LID) Commander posts, with future promotions forthcoming. Yet, these top echelon posts are becoming fewer and fewer due to the continuous openings for new NDC intakes. Thus, NDC graduates are not sure to be promoted to top echelon posts, instead facing a shortage of posts and a corresponding quota system.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the level of success seen in the first intake has never again been matched. From the seventh to ninth intakes, for example, not a single trainee has reached the ranks of the top echelon posts, owing largely to their being no vacancies, as the top posts remain saturated with graduates from previous intakes. Similarly, the second to sixth intakes involved a total of 266 trainees, of whom only 31 have realized top echelon postings. Additionally, the success rate for each class from the second to sixth intakes steadily decreased from 20 percent to a mere 5 percent.

Due to the no vacancy problem, 70 of the 134 ninth intake trainees, the 2009 class, will be assigned to contest the upcoming 2010 election upon completion of their training. The remaining 64 trainees will be promoted to Regional Command Commanders and some civilian posts under government ministries.

In a similar fashion, prior to 1993 Battalion Commanders with a Lieutenant Colonel rank attended General Staff Officer College, with most being promoted to General Staff Officer (Grade I) and eventually to Regional Command Commander posts. Now, only a few Strategic and Tactical Command Commanders with a rank of Colonel who graduate from the NDC are promoted to these top echelon posts – leading to much anxiety among prospective candidates. Further, a SLORC initiative has made Grade I posts subservient to those of the relatively newly created Colonel GS.

In such a compromised situation, NDC Principal and Assessment Board Chairman Myat Hein can manipulate results and readily accepts bribes as a means of swaying decisions. Yet, his position is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to bribery in the bid for special treatment and promotion within Burma’s military ranks.

The methodology in bribery is varied. Some sponsor a golf tournament, some cover shopping expenses or utility permits, and others engage in the delivery of liquor licenses. Moreover, bribes, both cash and in kind, must be given to all college personnel, from the principal to instructors. Put simply, bribery has become institutionalized.

Further, the cost to attend the almost one-year course is huge, over 10 million kyats (approximately US$ 10,000), and trainees are responsible for procuring such items as photocopiers and computers at their own expense and must compete with other trainees in a bid to procure the latest models.

To solve this problem, the number of trainees should be limited based on the number of vacancies available. For instance, if there are 17 anticipated vacant posts, the number of trainees for a new NDC batch should not be more than three times this number, or about 50. The exact number should be decided by the NDC Policy Guiding Board and sent to the Chief of the Armed Forces Training through the Military Appointment General.

But rather than limiting the number of trainees selected for each NDC batch, hundreds are sent through the system, resulting in widespread uncertainty in professional development, let alone jeopardizing graduation from the training itself.

And what happens even if one is lucky enough to pass through the NDC and achieve a rank of Brigadier General? Still, the individual’s job is not secure and can be taken from them at any time on the basis of any triviality. For instance, LID 55 Commander Brigadier General Than Tun and MOC 4 Commander Brigadier General Saw Hla Min were made Ambassadors for their alleged hybrid Chinese blood.

While true that some officers rise through the ranks without attending the NDC, most NDC trainees come from Tactical and Strategic Operation Command Commander posts, meaning they have no outside source of income and no authority over field units. This only compounds the problem of their having to bear all expenses for the cost of the NDC course – not uncommonly leading to the selling of personal property such as jewelry to help make ends meet.

Of Strategic and Tactical Operation Command Commander posts, Strategic posts are more lucrative than their Tactical counterparts – the former falling under the Regional Command Commander, while the latter lie under the jurisdiction of the LID Commander. More importantly, Strategic Operation Command Commanders can have their hands in civil administrative affairs, meaning they can enjoy handouts and kickbacks if their bosses agree to turn a blind eye.

Nonetheless, in comparison with the lives of Battalion Commanders, who can enjoy a lot of extra and illegal income, the lives of Strategic and Tactical Commanders are miserable. When Battalion Commanders go to General Staff Officers College, for example, they can receive full financial support.

With a golden insignia on their shoulders, many may think Burma’s NDC graduates and officer corps are necessarily well taken care of. But the truth is that many Strategic and Tactical Command Commanders, as well as others, have difficulty in coping with daily living expenses while also finding it necessary to grease the palms of their authorities. And if this were not enough, many are also forced to swallow their pride and discontent simply to save their current post.