Tin Oo’s release – a victory for whom?

Tuesday, 16 February 2010 14:57 Joseph Ball (Commentary)

The release this past Saturday of the National League for Democracy’s second-in-command, Retired General Tin Oo, must not be misconstrued as a success in the opposition’s continual battle against military rule in Burma. If anything, it hopefully heralds a long overdue wake-up call for the political opposition, as the junta continues to unilaterally dictate the pace and direction of socio-political cum economic reform in the country.

As porous as the judicial verdict may have been to place Tin Oo, or any political prisoners for that matter, under detention, the fact remains that the junta can point to his time being served and their honoring the expiration of the punishment. And as jaded as the logic is, in the run-up to the anticipated general election at the close of this year and in light of the practical power matrix inside the country, the release of Tin Oo will score Naypyitaw points well beyond the artificial lakes and vast thoroughfares of the junta’s capital.

Moreover, recent attention on the release of the former commander in chief of the armed forces turned democracy stalwart raises important questions surrounding the issue of political prisoners in Burma’s ongoing “civil war” (for all practical purposes and regarding damages rendered to the country, it is a civil war). As hard as it undoubtedly will be to accept, it just may be time to question the primacy afforded the call for the release of political prisoners in untangling the country’s political knots.

Nelson Mandela, to whom Aung San Suu Kyi has often been compared, was not freed solely as a result of pressure brought forth by his supporters or the international community. No. While such pressure was well publicized, he was set free after the ruling elites reached a de facto agreement on the near term direction for the country – a course which significantly left in place virtually all the economic interests of the apartheid regime.

But the important point for Burma is that the release of Robben Island’s most famous inmate was not in and of itself a seminal event in the country’s transformation – as necessary as his release came to be appreciated by all involved. Mandela’s release was instead a response to events already moving apace. As evidence of how quickly events overtook the opposition leader, he was even forced to ask his jailors to remain in prison a bit longer, a request subsequently denied, so he could better prepare himself and his speeches.

Returning to Burma, the much ballyhooed Shwegondaing Declaration, unveiled by National League for Democracy leadership in April 2009, again attempts to redress Burma’s political crisis in grandiose claims aimed at rectifying past injustices. Though included as a principle call in the Declaration, the junta’s assessment of the release of political prisoners, as it is in the case of Tin Oo, owes nothing to the “moral” imperative of releasing prisoners of conscience.

Any blanket release of political prisoners as well as a review of the constitution, another demand of the Declaration, can only come about as products of a process, as opposed to the hoped-for hallmark in and of themselves of a new era in Burmese society. Meanwhile, recognition of the 1990 general election result is today of any debatable significance, as the terms of those elected have now long since expired, not to mention the physical expiration of numerous elected parliamentarians. In short, it carries only symbolic importance.

Taking all the above into consideration, the release of Tin Oo, welcomed as it is, serves first and foremost as a manifestation of the perceived security of the generals in dictating the direction of the country. He was released in conjunction with the expiration of his term, and far from auguring in a period of constitutional reflection and political dialogue as envisioned by the opposition, his release as it stands aims singularly at legitimizing the constitution and electoral processes along with providing a theoretical arena for dialogue.

Yet Tin Oo, and other political prisoners either remaining under detention or freed in the not so distant future, can play a critical and long-desired role in reform across Burmese society. They without question possess the power to assist in moving the country forward, but it must of necessity be cognizant of ground realities, a road traveled in the company of the Tatmadaw.

Especially in the case of Tin Oo and his decorated military career, can he jumpstart a prominent platform within the political opposition empathetic to the security – physical and otherwise – concerns of Burma’s officer corps? As a former military man, he is better positioned to play this role than most.

Though the National League for Democracy has before explored the relationship of Burma’s armed forces in a transformed Burma, past results proved inadequate in securing working a relationship between the country’s competing factions, most significantly in leading up to the1990 election and in the immediate aftermath of the disastrous polling.

Trust, adrift for over 20 years, has to be rebuilt between the ranks of military and civilian leadership – a mutual appreciation, even if not always sympathetic, of competing yet supplemental agendas. In Thailand, implemented under the premiership Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, this went so far as incorporating a well-received joint military-civilian course at the national defense academy.

Burma’s political opposition should by all means embrace the release of Tin Oo. But do not confuse it as a sign of victory regarding what has to realistically be defined as a long-standing failed strategic agenda relating to both the release of political prisoners and the broader transformation of Burmese society. It is time to explore alternative strategies, albeit with the same goals in mind. Maybe then, via the continuity of an accepted process of reform across Burmese society, will we come to witness the release of all political prisoners.

Today, if we are to be brutally honest with what has to happen to move Burma forward, the country is confronted by a polarizing struggle between competing elitist cliques. It is not authoritarian rule per se that renders the country a backwater in the modern annals of development – be it political, economic or otherwise in orientation – but a rueful shortcoming in leadership.

Can the release of Tin Oo, let alone the words and actions of other noted political prisoners, serve to restructure the heretofore static equation, critically reassessing what has to happen to suture Burma’s gaping political wounds? Tens of millions of people are hoping this proves the case.