Burma has nuclear ambitions: report

Saturday, 30 January 2010 15:57 Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Burma’s military junta nurses nuclear ambitions, though there is insufficient evidence to prove the regime is building a secret nuclear reactor or facilities, a leading ‘Think Tank’ from the United States said.

David Albright, Paul Brannan, Robert Kelley and Andrea Scheel Stricker, well-known experts of proliferation of nuclear weapons, in a report said the Burmese regime’s suspicious links to North Korea and Russia’s agreement to sell a nuclear reactor to Burma in 2001 has led to suspicion of the junta’s nuclear intentions.

The report published by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) on January 28, 2010, said “Although evidence does not exist to make a compelling case that Burma is building secret nuclear reactors or fuel cycle facilities, as has been reported, the information does warrant governments and companies adopting extreme caution in any dealings with Burma.”

The authors of the report said, suspicions about Burma’s nuclear intentions came after the junta reached an agreement with Russia to sell a research reactor in 2001 and the resumption of a formal military relationship between North Korea and Burma in 2007 intensified.

Though information available is incomplete, US officials are concerned that the Burmese regime’s relationship with North Korea could possibly extend to nuclear cooperation, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton saying, in July 2009, “We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma, which we take seriously.”

Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, on Thursday told reporters in Washington, “We - in our discussions with Burma, do have concerns about certain activity and the potential - that create risks to the global non-proliferation agenda.”

The report, titled ‘Burma: A Nuclear Wannabe; Suspicious Links to North Korea; High-Tech Procurements and Enigmatic Facilities’, said certain equipment, which could be used in a nuclear or missile programme, went to isolated Burmese manufacturing compounds of unknown purpose.

Evidence on Burma and North Korea’s relationship supports that the two countries have discussed nuclear cooperation, “but is not sufficient to establish that North Korea is building nuclear facilities for Burma’s military junta, despite recent reports to the contrary,” the report said.

“Nonetheless, no one can ignore the possibility of significant North Korean nuclear assistance to this enigmatic, military regime,” said the authors, giving the example of North Korea’s secret sales of a reactor to Syria, which went unnoticed even by the world’s best intelligence agencies until late in the reactor’s construction.

The authors also urged governments and companies to be vigilant in examining Burma’s enquiries or requests for equipment, whether via Burmese governmental entities, Burmese trading companies or other foreign trading companies because Burma is buying a wide variety of suspicious dual-use goods internationally.

“Companies should treat enquiries from Burma no differently than those from Iran, Pakistan, or Syria,” the report said.

Another evidence, leading to suspicion of Burma’s nuclear ambition is the reported presence of officials from Namchongang Trading (NCG), a North Korean trading company that has sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the authors said.

While the nature of cooperation between Burma and NCG, which also reportedly assisted Syria’s reactor project, remains largely unknown, the NCG was said to have sold equipment to Burma or provided some type of technical assistance.

Though there is no concrete evidence of North Korea supplying Burma a reactor, the report said, “Any involvement by NCG in Burma is bound to increase suspicions about such a sale.”

The report also analyses the possibilities of Burma using North Korean trading entities to acquire overseas sensitive nuclear and nuclear dual use goods.

“Its military cooperation with North Korea has increased over the last several years, fuelling concerns about nuclear cooperation. North Korea could also supplement Burma’s own foreign procurement networks, and it could sell nuclear goods made in North Korea,” the report said.

The authors said, given the evidence, there remain sound reasons to suspect that the military regime in Burma might be pursuing a long-term strategy to make nuclear weapons. However, contrary to public reports, the military junta does not appear to be close to establishing a significant nuclear capability.

“Information suggesting the construction of major nuclear facilities appears unreliable or inconclusive,” the report said.

Although Burma and North Korea appear to be cooperating on illegal procurements, who is helping who cannot be determined with the available information, the authors said.

“Nonetheless, the evidence supports that the regime wants to develop a nuclear capability of some type, but whether its ultimate purpose is peaceful or military remains a mystery,” the report said.

The authors, while concluding, suggest that the outstanding questions about the regime’s activities require that there be more scrutiny of Burma to ascertain if there is an underlying secret nuclear programme.

“A priority is to establish greater transparency over Burma’s and North Korea’s activities and inhibit any nuclear or nuclear dual-use transfers to Burma. A related problem is ensuring that Burma is not helping North Korea acquire nuclear and other military goods illegally,” the report suggested.