Mizzima
Key findings
• The 2025-2026 election is the fourth general election since 2010. It is the first election to combine Proportional Representation (PR) with the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, which had been used in all previous elections.
• This election was held after the results of the 2020 election were annulled, and the National League for Democracy (NLD), the main party that won, was dissolved along with some ethnic political parties.
• This election was not held all at once across the country. Instead, it took place in three separate stages: the first stage in 102 townships on December 28, 2025; the second in 100 townships on January 11, 2026; and the final stage in 61 townships on January 25, 2026.
• This election occurred when revolutionary forces controlled 33% of the country, while the military junta held and contested the remaining 67%.
• This election occurred when approximately 3.5 million people were internally displaced due to local battles, armed conflicts, and natural disasters, affecting about 70% of the country.
• Before this election, the military junta passed the Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction. From its adoption in July 2025 through January 19, 2026, 404 people were detained under this law, and some were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to seven years.
• Before this election, the army-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) had already secured 27 seats, and three ethnic parties had gained three seats in parliament as they faced no opposition.
1. Background
Using claims of electoral fraud, the Myanmar military, also known as the Tatmadaw, nullified the 2020 election results and took control on February 1, 2021. The next day, the State Administration Council (SAC) was established and led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. They stated that after following procedures under the state of emergency, they would hold a free and fair general election in line with the 2008 Constitution and return power to the elected party.
After the military coup, many individuals were detained, including members of unions, state and regional government officials, civilian political leaders, and election commission officials at various levels. They were sentenced to lengthy prison terms on various charges. Although some were later granted amnesty, most remain incarcerated for the long term.
The military junta extended the state of emergency up to six times, each for six months. Subsequently, they stated they would hold an election in 2025. On January 26, 2023, they adopted a new Law, which would create barriers for major political parties with strong public support from competing in elections. The law was later amended multiple times.
Under Article 412 of the 2008 Constitution, which governs the state of emergency, it can normally be extended twice, each time for six months. However, the military extended it seven times, citing various reasons. After the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on July 31, 2025, the State Administration Council (SAC) was abolished and replaced by the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC). In this commission, the junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, assumed dual roles as Acting President and Chair. Several army generals were also demobilized and appointed to lead government agencies.
From the perspective of the public and the international community, the junta’s 2025 election was simply an attempt to dodge accountability for the violence during the coup period. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy (ISP) Myanmar, there were at least 92 incidents where 10 or more civilians were killed at once over four years, resulting in over 1,800 civilian deaths. Of these, 88 were carried out by the SSPC, and more than half reportedly involved airstrikes.
Therefore, given the current military, political, and on-the-ground situation—along with the lack of stability in constituencies, low public trust, and international positions—it is clear that the junta’s 2025 election was just a sham.
2. The adoption of the new Political Parties Registration Law
Following Myanmar’s adoption of the 2008 Constitution, the Political Parties Registration Law was enacted on March 8, 2010. It imposed strict restrictions on political parties and created numerous barriers for major parties with strong public support, such as the NLD. The law was amended on November 4, 2011, before the 2012 by-election, allowing the NLD to participate. The amendments changed three key provisions of the original law: they removed the rule that party members must not be prisoners, relaxed the requirement that a party contest at least three seats in Parliament to prevent restrictions on new parties formed after the election, and changed the phrase “the constitution must be maintained and protected” to “must be respected and followed.” As a result of these changes, the NLD competed in the 2012 by-election, winning 43 out of 44 seats and entering Parliament.
On January 26, 2023, the military repealed the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law and enacted a new one. Under the new law, political parties seeking union-level registration must recruit at least 100,000 members within 90 days of approval and open offices in at least half of the country’s 330 townships within 180 days. Parties registering at the state or regional level must recruit at least 1,000 members within 90 days and establish offices in at least five townships within their respective states or regions. Union-level parties are required to deposit 1,000 lakh MMK at the state-owned Myanma Economic Bank, while parties at the state or regional level must deposit 100 lakh MMK.
Following the new law’s adoption, many parties failed to re-register, and others were automatically dissolved. According to Article 25, parties that did not re-register within 60 days of the law’s enactment lost their legal status. This created an additional legal obstacle for the NLD, which had already been dissolved after the coup. Political observers see this as an attempt to influence the electoral environment in the absence of the NLD. The military junta thus took proactive steps to prevent a repeat of the past, when former President U Thein Sein amended the law to allow the NLD to participate in a by-election.
For reasons such as failure to re-register or non-compliance with legal requirements, the Union Election Commission (UEC) canceled several political parties. On March 28, 2023, it announced the dissolution of 40 political parties, including the NLD. As a result, the junta’s Political Parties Registration Law greatly restricted political parties’ ability to participate in upcoming elections and threatened their continued existence.
After passing the Political Parties Registration Law before the election, the junta amended it three times: on January 30, 2024; July 28, 2025; and September 21, 2025. However, these amendments were not aimed at promoting national reconciliation. Instead, they placed burdens on political parties.
Under the First Amendment, a political party whose registration is canceled must transfer its property to the state. Under the Second Amendment, if the Union Election Commission (UEC) determines that a party has engaged in electoral fraud or illegal conduct, it may be disqualified from holding political party status. This provision is seen as shaping future elections without the NLD. The Third Amendment was adopted one day before the deadline for submitting candidate lists. According to this change, union-level parties are allowed to contest only one quarter of the constituencies, instead of more than half, in the 2025 election. These amendments appear designed to prevent a scenario where the USDP would be the only party remaining eligible to participate due to strict regulations.
One of the most talked-about news items among the public was that the NLD did not re-register under the new registration law. However, significant developments had already taken place before the law was enacted. The Union Betterment Party, led by retired General Thura Shwe Man, was dissolved before the law’s adoption and thus avoided the difficulties imposed by the new requirements. Among the parties that did not re-register, some refused to recognize the military junta, while others opposed the new law. Additionally, some parties dissolved to form new parties or to merge with others.
In summary, the core of the junta’s Political Parties Registration Law is strategic: to prevent the continued existence of political parties with strong public support, such as the NLD and some ethnic parties; to block the emergence of new powerful opposition parties in the future; and to ensure that only weak, small political parties remain, allowing the USDP to survive in upcoming elections.
3. The Union Election Commission (UEC)
A day after the coup, on February 2, 2021, the junta established a new Union Election Commission (UEC). Its chair was former Major General U Thein Soe, who had a controversial reputation for electoral fraud in the 2010 election. He had overseen the 2010 election, organized by the so-called State Peace and Development Council, which resulted in a landslide victory for the army proxy, the USDP. During the previous military regime, he held high positions, including the military judge advocate-general and the deputy chief justice of the Supreme Court. He was also a graduate of the Defence Service Academy (Intake 16). In a meeting with political parties on May 21, 2021, following the coup, he told the media: “We must cancel the registration of the NLD Party for their illegal plan. We must also take action against the individual perpetrators as traitors.”
On June 21, 2021, the junta’s UEC announced that the 2020 election did not follow parliamentary laws and rules and was neither free nor fair. One month later, on July 26, it cancelled the election.
This raised the question of whether the UEC has the authority to annul election results. According to Article (399) of the 2008 Constitution, the UEC is responsible for organizing and supervising elections, forming and overseeing sub-commissions, managing constituencies and voter lists, postponing elections in areas where they cannot be held, instructing political parties, and establishing election tribunals to resolve disputes. However, it lacks the authority to review or annul the results of an entire election or to call a new one. Similarly, such powers are not specified in Article 10 of the Union Election Commission Law, which outlines the UEC’s rights and responsibilities.
Chapter 5 of the electoral laws for the respective parliaments states that only a rival candidate or a voter in the constituency may submit a complaint against an elected candidate. Organizations such as political parties or the Tatmadaw (military) are not permitted to do so. Under the legal provision, such complaints must be investigated by an electoral tribunal, and the candidate’s victory must be canceled if it is determined that the candidate won through unlawful conduct.
Based on the above legal provisions, it is evident that the UEC can establish an electoral tribunal only after receiving a constituency-level complaint and can revoke the victory status of individual candidates only after such a complaint. Consequently, the UEC’s annulment of the 2020 election results was clearly contrary to the applicable laws.
On August 11, the junta’s UEC issued a directive requiring political parties to notify it in advance and obtain permission before meeting with any foreign organization or individual. Failure to comply could result in the cancellation of the party. This statement indicates that political parties may face such serious consequences for meeting with foreign-based media outlets.
On September 9, the junta’s UEC revoked the registration of four political parties—National Democratic Force Party (NDF), Democratic Party of National Politics (DNP), Women Party-Mon, and Union Farmer Labour Force Party—and dissolved them. Additionally, it removed Daw Thet Thet Khine, the chair of the People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) and a candidate for No. (2) Yangon Regional Constituency of the Amyotha Hluttaw, from the candidate list, and rejected her appeal.
After the second phase of the election, officials from the junta’s Military Security Office took Daw Thet Thet Khine for questioning, claiming she had secretly met with officials from a foreign embassy at a restaurant on Natmauk Street in Yangon while wearing a mask. She was released the next day. However, the UEC announced that it would take legal action against her and Daw Htet Htet Hlaing, an EC member of the PPP, for failing to inform it in advance of the meeting.
Overall, the UEC’s role is to oversee the exercise of the right to vote and be elected under the Union Election Law and to supervise political parties. However, the military junta has enforced strict legal restrictions, allowing no political freedom outside of the USDP. The UEC has also gone well beyond its initial responsibilities to appease the junta. It clearly suppresses political parties through directives that extend beyond mere oversight.
4. The state of political parties during the military coup period
The military junta seized power on February 1, 2021, the day the elected MPs from the 2020 election were scheduled to convene their new parliament. They then nullified the election results and imposed strict controls on political parties by enacting a new party registration law.
The UEC cancelled 41 political parties for failing to register on time. Among them were the NLD and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which had won a majority in the 2020 election. During the military coup, political parties faced the worst situation in the country’s history.
Although some parties applied for registration under the new law, the UEC rejected them. These included the Democratic Party, Chin People’s Party, Union Development Party, New Society Party, and Zomi Congress for Democracy. On September 9, 2025, the UEC also revoked the registration of three union-level parties—the NDF, the DNP, and the Women’s Party (Mon)—and dissolved them, citing their failure to open the required number of offices. Currently, 57 parties remain officially registered.
5. The electoral system
On July 29, 2025, the military junta passed the sixth amendment to the election laws for the three parliaments: Pyithu Hluttaw, Amyotha Hluttaw, and State/Regional Hluttaw. It introduced many changes to the electoral system. The amendment added new eligibility criteria for candidates: a citizen aged 25 or older, born to citizen parents, listed as a voter in the constituency, having completed basic education (high school level), and free from any inappropriate debts or liabilities to the state or private parties. The most recent application of the liability amendment was the removal of Daw Thet Thet Khine, Chair of the PPP, from the candidate list.
5.1- The electoral system and constituencies
The 2025 election included 274 constituencies for Pyithu Hluttaw via first-past-the-post (FPTP), 101 constituencies, including six self-administered areas, for Amyotha Hluttaw through both FPTP and proportional representation (PR), 266 constituencies for State/Regional Hluttaw via FPTP, 42 constituencies via PR, and 29 ethnic constituencies for State/Regional Hluttaw via FPTP.
However, due to nationwide fighting, elections could not be held in all of the originally scheduled constituencies. On February 3, the UEC released the final list of elected MPs. Reportedly, elections were only held in 263 constituencies for Pyithu Hluttaw, including six self-administered areas, as well as 73 FPTP constituencies and 26 PR constituencies for Amyotha Hluttaw, and also in 255 FPTP constituencies, 42 PR constituencies, and ethnic constituencies for State/Regional Hluttaw.
During the 2025-2026 election, the junta used only the FPTP system for the Pyithu Hluttaw. For the Amyotha Hluttaw and State/Regional Hluttaw, a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system combining FPTP and proportional representation (PR) was employed. In each state and region, 12 MPs were elected to the Amyotha Hluttaw: six through FPTP and six through PR. To facilitate this, each state or region was divided into six constituencies to elect six MPs via FPTP, while the remaining six MPs were elected from political parties through PR. MPs for the Amyotha Hluttaw in self-administered areas and for the State/Regional Hluttaw in ethnic constituencies were elected through FPTP.
Similarly, in the State and Regional Hluttaw, each township elects two MPs: one under FPTP and one under PR. For the FPTP seat, each entire township is considered a single constituency. For the PR seat, neighbouring townships are combined to form a constituency for political parties.
Reportedly, 4,963 candidates from 57 political parties and independent candidates submitted their names to the UEC. These included six union-level parties and 51 state- and regional-level parties. According to the UEC, the army-backed USDP fielded the most candidates with 1,018, followed by the National Unity Party (NUP) with 649, the PPP with 672, the Shan and Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) with 584, the MFDF with 428, and the People’s Party (PP) with 512.
5.2- Myanmar Electronic Voting Machine (MEVM)
In the 2025 election, the military junta introduced a new voting method that had never been used in the country’s election history. It replaced the method of stamped paper ballots with electronic voting machines (EVMs). Before the election, repeated propaganda claimed that EVMs would allow voters to cast their ballots easily and conveniently and that results would be counted accurately and quickly.
However, throughout all three phases of the election, many MEVMs experienced repeated technical issues. These included incorrect text on printed paper slips, improperly cut paper slips, green indicator lights not turning on, malfunctioning control machines, and incorrect date and time displays. As a result, reserve MEVMs were required. In Naypyidaw, voting was delayed because there weren’t enough MEVMs.
In the first phase of the election, MEVM defects were reported at polling stations in Sittway, Hinthada, Yangon, and Dawei. In Bago Township alone, up to 21 polling stations experienced MEVM defects or damage. In the second phase, similar problems occurred in Wakema, Maukme Township, Kunchangone, and Kawmu. U Kyaw Kyaw Htwe, a PP candidate in Kawmu, reported that at one polling station, when the voting machine was pressed 12 times, six votes were recorded for a major party. In Kunchangone, the switch for the PP candidate failed. Only after the issue was reported did the responsible personnel acknowledge that it was a machine defect.
6. The situation of political parties in the pre-election period
The pre-election period of the junta’s 2025 election presented many difficulties and challenges, even for official political parties. A total of 63 parties re-registered. Although 57 parties have survived so far, most continue to struggle with hardships.
A major issue is that under the old law, a union-level party was required to recruit only 1,000 members nationwide. Under the new law, this number has increased 100-fold, to 100,000 members. In addition, the party must recruit this number within 90 days of registration, open party offices in at least half of the 330 townships across the country, and contest in half of the constituencies. If a party fails to submit the required number of members to the UEC on time, its registration will be canceled.
This requirement was for a very short period for union-level parties. Later amendments relaxed some provisions, but many parties refrained from contesting at the union level due to nationwide anti-junta resistance, local instability, rising numbers of displaced people, and cross-border migration. Instead, they focused on contesting in their respective states and regions.
Currently, about 3.6 million internally displaced people are affected. Armed conflicts continue in Northern Shan, Karen State, Kayah State, Kachin State, Mon State, Sagaing Region, and Magway Region. Additionally, the military junta has declared martial law in 63 townships across nine states and regions. Under these conditions, political parties face significant challenges in campaigning freely and opening party offices. For these reasons, apart from the six major parties, most others only contested at the state level.
The six union-level parties were the USDP, the NUP, the PPP, the MFDP, the SNLD (White Tiger Party), and the PP. Some of them couldn’t open party offices in Kayah State, Chin State, and Rakhine State because of ongoing fighting. Besides the USDP, none of the others won any seats in the 2020 election.
7. Legal measures to prevent election disturbances
On July 31, 2025, the military junta dissolved the SAC and replaced it with the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC). One day earlier, on July 30, 2025, they announced that the Cybersecurity Law, adopted on January 1, 2025, had gone into effect. It restricts the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) without authorization and enhances existing internet controls under the Telecommunications Law and the Electronic Transactions Law, which was adopted in 2013.
Furthermore, the military junta suspended Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the Protection of Personal Liberty and Personal Security of Citizens Law, which was enacted by the Union Parliament under the NLD government on March 8, 2017. Article 5 mandates the presence of at least two responsible ward or village administrators during a house search or a citizen’s arrest. Article 7 restricts detention to no more than 24 hours without a court order. Article 8 prohibits searches, property seizures, and arrests without a legal warrant. By suspending these provisions, the junta created conditions that prevent any interference with their 2025 election.
However, this alone did not fully satisfy the junta’s goal of ensuring the success of their election. Unable to tolerate any criticism of the electoral process, they enacted the Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction, which imposes harsh sentences, on July 29, 2025.
According to this law, even minor criticism related to the junta’s election could lead to severe imprisonment and fines. If a crime results in someone’s death, all involved could face the death penalty. Public acts such as speaking, campaigning, protesting, or writing that harm the electoral process carry 3 to 7 years in prison, and 5 to 10 years if committed during a gathering. Threatening, preventing, disturbing, or harming voters, polling staff, election commission members, or candidates during campaigning or official duties can result in 3 to 20 years in prison, and 5 years to life if committed in a gathering. Destroying or damaging ballot papers, polling boxes, MEVMs, commission offices, or polling buildings carries a term of 5 to 10 years in prison and a fine.
Throughout the country’s election history, freedom of expression has been permitted to some degree to facilitate free and fair elections. Electoral crimes and their penalties were already outlined in prior electoral laws, including those for various parliaments. However, the junta’s Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections states that, regardless of existing laws, any offense related to this law will be prosecuted under this law.
If a citizen in the country reacts to a social media post about the election, they can face arrest, lawsuits, and imprisonment under this law. From July 2025 to January 19, 2026, 404 people were detained under this law, and some received sentences of at least 3 to 7 years in prison.
8. Election observations
Observing an election involves monitoring whether it is free and fair. It evaluates the conduct of the entire election process against the constitution, electoral laws, and international standards. Election observation is not limited to election day; it encompasses the entire election period. However, during the 2025 election, the junta restricted freedom of information. They invited only a few delegations from countries with which they have relations, and neither permitted nor cooperated with independent international election observation organizations. This made it clear that the junta’s election could not be properly assessed for fairness or freedom.
According to the junta propaganda media, observers from Russia, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and India watched the first phase of the election on December 28. The military junta reported that a delegation from India, led by retired General Arun Kumar Sahni, was present. However, sources told The Wire that the Indian government did not send any official delegation to observe the election in Myanmar, and the individuals mentioned participated in a private capacity. Sahni also confirmed from Naypyidaw that he and another Indian participant, strategic affairs commentator Atul Aneja, attended the election “on the invitation of the Myanmar Election Commission.”
During the third phase on January 25, observers from Belarus, Cambodia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, India, Indonesia, and Nepal, as well as the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP), monitored the election. Analyzing the observing countries shows that many maintain power by suppressing opposition forces or operate under single-party systems.
9. Situation on the election days
Local and international media reported very low voter turnout and a climate of fear during the first phase of the election. International media outlets, permitted to report on Election Day, included The New York Times, ABC News Australia, CNN, and The Straits Times. They observed that the December 28 election differed markedly from those in 2015 and 2020, when the NLD won. Voters seemed overwhelmed by fear. This election was held only after the arrest and imprisonment of MPs elected in 2020, including NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
On the one hand, some people voted because they supported the junta’s election. On the other hand, others voted because of unavoidable pressure. Specifically, some feared issues involving family members of conscription age, while others were threatened that households would not be allowed to re-register overnight guests if they did not vote. Under these various pressures and hardships, many voters had no choice but to cast their ballots.
9.1- Voting conditions on the election day
In Myanmar, there is no specific requirement regarding the number of voters who must participate for an election to be valid. However, under international standards, voter turnout exceeding 50 percent is often regarded as indicating public representation. At a junta meeting on August 12, 2025, the junta leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, stated that the election law does not specify a required turnout and that if 50 percent or more of voters participate, the election can be considered to reflect the will of most people.
Subsequently, the junta’s spokesperson, Major General Zaw Min Tun, stated that during the first phase of the election on December 28, voting took place in 102 townships, with over 6 million of the more than 11 million eligible voters participating, resulting in a 52.13 percent turnout. He claimed this made the election successful even before the detailed results for individual townships were released.
However, an investigation by Mizzima cross-checked the figures for all 102 townships in the first phase with accounts from local residents. The UEC was found to have strictly controlled information, with some local commissions refusing to provide data or referring inquiries to the central commission. In most townships, voter turnout was significantly lower than reported and differed from the officially released figures.
In Naypyidaw, where the junta’s control is strongest, as well as in some towns with significant military influence and areas supportive of the USDP, voter turnout averaged around 66%. However, in most states and regions, the highest turnout ranged from over 47% to 30%. Notably, voter turnout was 22.18% in Chin State and 10.31% in Tedim Township. In Tedim, there were 3,980 registered voters but 4,235 valid votes, indicating 255 more valid votes than registered voters. In the Yangon Region, among 12 townships, turnout was 30.63% in Ahlone Township, while the others were around 30%. High turnout was reported primarily in Naypyidaw and in areas with a strong military presence. In reality, voter and valid vote counts did not match; information was concealed, and many discrepancies arose when compared with media investigations. As a result, the election outcomes were highly controversial.
Overall, the average voter turnout on the first phase election day was no more than 40%. Although a candidate predicted a turnout of 50-60%, the actual turnout was approximately 40%. According to Data for Myanmar, voter turnout in the first phase was reported as 52.13%.
In response to media inquiries on January 26, 2026, the junta’s spokesperson, Major General Zaw Min Tun, stated that over 24.22 million eligible voters participated across all three phases of the 2025 election. In the first phase, more than 6.09 million of 11.69 million eligible voters cast their ballots, representing a 52.13% turnout. In the second phase, 4.24 million of the 7.59 million eligible voters cast ballots, resulting in a 55.95% turnout. In the third phase, more than 2.79 million of 4.94 million eligible voters cast ballots, accounting for 56.48%.
9.2- Targeted attacks on election days
Even before the junta’s election, anti-junta democratic forces, armed groups, and international organizations criticized the election as a sham used for political legitimacy. On election days, there were many targeted attacks, which were reported by both media outlets and armed groups.
According to the junta, after all three election phases, a total of 54 disturbance cases were reported across 41 townships. These included the distribution and placement of anti-election propaganda leaflets in public places, campaigning and graffiti calling for no voting, hanging posters, shouting slogans, swearing, using loudspeakers to urge boycotts, and damaging or burning voter education signboards and posters (up to 23 incidents). There were also four attacks on polling station security staff, six bomb attacks, two homemade sound bomb explosions, six grenade and homemade mine attacks, three rocket attacks, three armed threats against election staff and candidates, and six arrests. As a result, two election staff members were killed, and two others plus seven civilians were injured.
9.3- Advance voting issue
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Myanmar citizens living abroad queued and cast advance votes at embassies. According to the 2024 census, more than 1.12 million citizens were residing abroad, with 69% living in Thailand. Currently, many young people are migrating to neighbouring Thailand, both legally and illegally, due to the coup and conscription policies. Civil society organizations estimate that roughly 5 million Myanmar nationals may now be living in Thailand.
The junta’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized early voting for citizens abroad by setting up polling stations at 50 embassies, permanent missions, and consulates general. Embassies encouraged citizens to vote early for the December 28 election. However, turnout was very low compared to previous elections. According to citizens in Thailand, Korea, and Japan, most voters were embassy staff and their families. An associate from the Bangkok Embassy mentioned that although more than 1,000 people applied for early voting, only about 100 civilians actually cast ballots. The total number of early voters was just over 270, including more than 100 embassy staff and scholarship students.
While advance voter turnout abroad was very low, advance voting was the most widely criticized issue across all three phases of the election in the country. After the first phase in Sittway Township, Kyauk Phyu Township, and Man Aung Township of Rakhine State, the chair of the Arakan Front Party, Dr. Aye Maung, told CNI that he had indeed lost the election but claimed that the voter list was inaccurate until election day and kept changing. He also said he did not receive advance votes from the army and Muslim voters, which contributed to his defeat. Additionally, the chair of the PP, U Ko Ko Gyi, criticized problems related to advance voting and voter lists on social media. A former general, U Hsan Hsint, an independent candidate from Yekyi Township in Ayeyarwady Region, also stated that controversial irregularities and rule violations were found during advance vote counting at the sub-commission. Despite widespread public criticism of advance voting, people were unable to express it openly because of severe penalties under laws enacted to protect the election.
In election townships of the Yangon Region, residents listed as overnight guests were not required to vote in person, and ward administrators automatically recorded advance votes, according to people who experienced this. Additionally, students at universities, degree colleges, and colleges nationwide faced threats of being denied enrollment if they did not vote. As a result, nearly 30,000 students were compelled to cast advance votes against their will.
Regarding advance voting, the PP, SNDP, and MFDF claimed that the collection of advance votes lacked transparency and had serious flaws. They submitted letters of complaint to the junta leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. In response to these allegations, the UEC stated on January 2 that advance voting was conducted in accordance with existing legal provisions.
As seen in the 2010 election, advance voting once again played a crucial role in 2025. The USDP won all three phases in most areas with large numbers of advance votes. Nearly all of these votes came from the military, government departments, and the junta’s supporters. Additionally, local administrators, acting as loyalists to the junta, collected advance votes in their areas through various means, including threats and improper practices, to please the junta authorities. In Myeik Township and Chaungsone Township, the USDP initially lost but later secured victory under controversial circumstances. Political parties were hesitant to file complaints with the UEC under current laws and bylaws. Instead, they seemed forced to appeal directly to the junta leader. This clearly demonstrates that the junta’s election was conducted under fear, lacked freedom and fairness, and failed to reflect the will of the people.
According to Data for Myanmar, USDP candidates received significantly more advance votes than any other candidates in 81 townships included in the first phase of the election. In this phase, 17% of all valid votes earned by the USDP were advance votes. Notably, USDP candidates won with 83% advance votes in Thandaunggyi Township, 79% in Bawlake Township, 52% in Ha Kha, and 47% in Kyauk Phyu Township.
The same pattern was observed for USDP candidates in 92 out of 94 townships included in the second phase, with the exceptions of Setoattara Township and Sisai Township. Reportedly, advance votes accounted for 14.65% of all the valid votes received by the USDP. Notably, the USDP candidate in Fruso Township received 74% of advance votes. Similarly, USDP candidates received 54% of advance votes in Demoso Township, 45% in Tanintharyi Township, 48% in Paukkaung, 42% in Pantaung Township, 45% in Ye Township, and 41% in Cocokyun Township. In Natmauk Township, Kalaw Township, and Maipan Township, although rival candidates initially won at the polling stations, they later lost due to the advance votes cast for the USDP.
10. International response
Throughout the coup period, ASEAN has expressed opposition to the election organized by the military junta. The association has consistently emphasized two key elements of the Five-Point Consensus: the cessation of violence and the conduct of inclusive dialogue before holding any election. However, several ASEAN member states, including Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Indonesia, sent delegations to observe the junta’s election.
In Parliament, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Mohamad Hasan, stated that ASEAN does not recognize the election. Additionally, they will not send any observer delegations.
The EU spokesperson also stated that the election organized by Myanmar’s military junta did not meet international standards and could not be considered free, fair, inclusive, or credible due to widespread violence in the country, restrictions on basic freedoms, mass arrests, exclusion of major political figures, and ongoing armed conflicts.
During the third phase of the election, in a meeting with the media after inspecting voting in Chanmya Thazi of Mandalay Region, the junta leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, responded to a journalist’s question about claims from the experts of the United Nations and some countries. He said he did not know whether the international community recognized the election; he only recognized the public vote.
Russia, Belarus, and China expressed their support for the junta’s election. Among ASEAN members, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos also supported it. However, during a press conference after the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Cebu City, Philippines, Foreign Minister Theresa “Tess” Parreño Lazaro stated that ASEAN did not endorse all three phases of Myanmar’s junta election. The Myanmar public and the international community, including the UN, see the election as a sham.
11. Election results
Starting January 3, the UEC began announcing the elected MPs for various parliaments in each phase. The final list was released on February 3. According to the UEC, the winners are as follows:
For the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 231 seats; the National Unity Party (NUP) secured 4 seats; the Shan and Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) earned 7 seats; the Pa-O National Organization (PNO) gained 5 seats; the Mon Unity Party (MUP) secured 5 seats; the Naga National Party (NNP) received 4 seats; the Karen National Democratic Party (KNDP) obtained 1 seat; the Rakhine Nationalities Party earned 1 seat; the Shan-ni Solidarity Party (SSP) captured 1 seat; the Danu Nationalities Democratic Party (DNDP) secured 1 seat; the Inn National League Party (INLP) gained 1 seat; the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) received 1 seat; and there was 1 independent MP, bringing the total to 263 MPs.
For the Amyotha Hluttaw, the elected MPs elected through the FPTP and PR systems were as follows: USDP 108 seats, NUP 16 seats, SNDP 1 seat, People’s Party (PP) 5 seats, People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) 1 seat, PNO 2 seats, MUP 5 seats, NNP 1 seat, the Arakan Front Party (AFP) 3 seats, KNDP 3 seats, Zomi National Party (ZNP) 3 seats, RNP 1 seat, DNDP 1 seat, Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party (TNDP) 1 seat, Kayah State People’s Party (KySPP) 1 seat, KSPP 1 seat, Pa-O National Unity Party (PNUP) 1 seat, Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party (PSDP) 1 seat, National Interest and Development Party (NIDP) 1 seat, and Wa National Party (WNP) 1 seat, totaling 157 seats.
12. Controversial issues
12.1- The naming issue of the Parliamentary term
In Myanmar, four elections have been held under the 2008 Constitution. Typically, parliamentary terms are called the First Hluttaw, Second Hluttaw, and so forth. Therefore, the Hluttaw formed after the junta’s fourth election should be considered the Fourth Hluttaw. However, at the first Central Committee meeting to convene the Hluttaw, held on January 29, it was announced that the upcoming Hluttaw would be treated as the Third Hluttaw, and regular meetings were scheduled accordingly. This suggests that the military junta does not recognize the 2020 election. Although it was the third election held under the 2008 Constitution, the 2020 election was accused of electoral fraud, and the military seized power on this basis. This issue has since become a major point of controversy in Myanmar’s politics.
12.2- Designating PR constituencies
The junta’s 2025 election introduced proportional representation (PR) for the first time, alongside the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. In 2014, discussions on PR took place in both the Amyotha Hluttaw and the Pyithu Hluttaw. After a debate in Amyotha Hluttaw, the proposal to adopt PR was approved by a vote. However, when the issue was discussed in Pyithu Hluttaw, the Chair of Pyithu Hluttaw referred the matter to the Constitutional Court to determine whether PR was compatible with the Constitution. The Court ruled that it was not. As a result, the discussion of PR in Pyithu Hluttaw ended, and the FPTP system continued to be used until 2020.
The military junta implemented a mixed FPTP-PR system for the Amyotha Hluttaw and State/Regional Hluttaws by amending election laws and by-laws. Under these amendments, in states where the junta had lost control of most areas, MPs were elected without direct public voting. For example, in Chin State, elections were only held in Hakha and Tedim out of the nine townships. However, for the nine PR seats, all townships were allocated proportionally among the three parties contesting in Hakha and Tedim. This arrangement undermined the democratic principle of public choice. Similar practices appeared in other states and regions. Such a PR designation is highly controversial regarding constitutional compliance and democratic legitimacy.
12.3- The future of People’s Pioneer Party (PPP)
On January 13, following the second phase, the Chair of the PPP, Daw Thet Thet Khine, was brought in for questioning by officials from the Military Security Chief Office. Although she was released the next day, the UEC issued a statement emphasizing that any political party that fails to comply with the Constitution and the Political Parties Registration Law could have its registration revoked. According to the UEC, the case involved her alleged secret meeting with officials from a foreign embassy at a restaurant on Natmauk Street on December 18, 2025. The UEC stated that legal action would be taken against her and another EC member of the PPP, Daw Htet Htet Hlaing, and hinted at the possible cancellation of the party’s registration. Consequently, public opinion suggests that the PPP may face deregistration, similar to the situation of the Unity Democratic Party, commonly known as the Rose Party, which had planned to contest the 2020 election with the second-largest number of candidates.
13. Summary
In the 2015 general election, voter turnout was 69.82%, and in the 2020 election, it increased to 71.89%. In contrast, voter turnout in the junta’s 2025 election, the fourth election since 2010, was the lowest of all post-2010 elections. Although the military junta officially claimed a total turnout of 54%, evidence suggests the actual turnout was likely much lower. This discrepancy highlights widespread public opposition to the junta-organized election.
The junta’s election represented the lowest point in dignity, public will, and representation in the country’s electoral history. Except for Naypyidaw and the Yangon Region, elections were only partially held in other states and regions. Public interest in the election was also the lowest ever, as fear and anxiety dominated the electoral environment.
An election is considered legitimate only when held under free and fair conditions. However, this election occurred amid widespread fighting in most regions, administrative collapse, and millions of internally displaced people caused by armed conflict. Therefore, it is evident that the junta’s 2025-2026 election was aimed at maintaining power rather than seeking a genuine political solution. In other words, it was a sham election designed to extend military rule while maintaining the appearance of a civilian government.
Additionally, according to the Special Envoy for Asian Affairs at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Deng Xijun, during a ceremony where international observers spoke, the junta’s implementation of the election was based on an agreement between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing. China’s preferred political setup for Myanmar includes 25% military representation and an additional 26% of civilian representatives who support the military. Therefore, China’s strong backing for the junta’s election is not aimed at promoting a democratic transition, but rather at securing its investments and boosting economic cooperation by maintaining influence over the military junta.
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