A regional look at ASEAN’s challenges for 2026 – Part 2

Mizzima/Rappler

In Part 2 of this assessment of ASEAN’s challenges for 2026 by Southeast Asian newsrooms – including Rappler, Mizzima, Kiripost and Malaysiakini – we take a look at the troublesome conflict between two ASEAN states, and review Malaysia’s chairing of the regional body in 2025.

Philippines Takes ASEAN Chair as Cambodia-Thailand Border Tensions Test Bloc’s Conflict-Management Role

As Manila assumes the 2026 ASEAN chairmanship, renewed fighting along the Cambodia-Thailand border and external mediation efforts place pressure on ASEAN’s centrality and credibility

By Prak Chan Thul

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia: As the Philippines takes up the 2026 chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ongoing tensions along the Cambodia-Thailand border have renewed scrutiny of the bloc’s ability to manage conflicts among its members and uphold its role in promoting regional peace and stability.

Long-standing disputes over an 800-kilometre stretch of border territory have led to intermittent lethal conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. The latest hostilities have escalated deep into Cambodia’s interior, resulting in significant casualties and a humanitarian crisis involving nearly one million displaced persons.

Cambodian analyst Panhavuth Long said the border tensions have affected ASEAN’s image as a bloc committed to peace.

“Border tensions between Cambodia and Thailand do undermine ASEAN’s image as a bloc committed to peace and stability,” he said. “When member states experience open confrontation, it raises doubts about ASEAN’s internal cohesion and its ability to uphold its norms. Even if such disputes remain bilateral, they have reputational consequences for ASEAN as a whole.”

He said the dispute can be viewed both as an embarrassment and as a test for ASEAN. “Such disputes can be seen both as an embarrassment and as a test. They are embarrassing because they highlight the gap between ASEAN’s rhetoric and its limited enforcement capacity.

“At the same time, they test whether ASEAN’s conflict-management mechanisms – such as chair-led diplomacy, quiet mediation and consultation frameworks – can function effectively. If ASEAN helps contain the dispute and support de-escalation, it may reinforce its credibility. If it remains passive, ASEAN risks being perceived as ineffective.”

External actors

On the role of external actors, Panhavuth said outside involvement could help reduce tensions but must not sideline ASEAN.

“External actors such as the United States may contribute to de-escalation by providing diplomatic leverage or humanitarian support. However, heavy external involvement also risks weakening ASEAN centrality if ASEAN appears unable to manage regional disputes independently.”

Chhai Bunsonareach, a Research Associate at the Asian Vision Institute, said ASEAN centrality in practice is limited by the bloc’s lack of enforcement powers.

“In practice, ASEAN centrality means it gives members a platform and rules, but not enforcement power,” he said. “It acts as a convener and norm-setter for wider regional processes, following the ‘ASEAN Way’ of informality, consensus, non-interference and mutual respect.”

Bunsonareach said that binding settlements are usually pursued outside ASEAN mechanisms. “When disputes escalate, ASEAN offers venues, statements, and sometimes observers, while binding settlements are pursued bilaterally or through bodies, like the International Court of Justice,” he said.

Bunsonareach added that the current tensions have harmed ASEAN’s reputation, particularly for smaller member states.

“The ongoing Cambodia-Thailand border tensions are damaging ASEAN’s reputation as a guarantor of peace and stability, a role on which small states like Cambodia depend,” he said.

Bunsonareach pointed to ASEAN’s overcautious response, including its decision not to activate the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation High Council, has raised concerns that quiet diplomacy alone may be insufficient to reassure smaller members when a larger neighbor resorts to force.

Resolving disputes

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed in 1976, sets rules for peaceful relations among ASEAN states and includes a High Council to resolve disputes, though it is rarely used as members prefer bilateral talks.

He added, however, the Joint Statement of December 27, 2025, shows that a small state can still leverage ASEAN’s regulations and procedures to support demining, deploy an ASEAN Observer Team (AOT), ensure a lasting ceasefire, and bind both sides to the UN Charter, the ASEAN Charter, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

On external involvement, he said US engagement can support de-escalation if framed within ASEAN-led efforts.

“US efforts are most beneficial when they are explicitly framed as reinforcing ASEAN-led processes, such as backing ASEAN chair statements, observer teams, and de-mining missions, rather than replacing ASEAN as the main broker,” he said. US President Donald Trump stepped in to try to bring peace in phone calls made in 2025.

Cambodian government response

Pen Bona, spokesperson for the Cambodian government, said Malaysia had worked throughout 2025 to facilitate a ceasefire and joint peace efforts. “Malaysia has tried very hard to have a ceasefire and a joint peace agreement in Kuala Lumpur,” he said, adding that Malaysia also supported the establishment of the AOT.

He said ASEAN foreign ministers met on January 29 to discuss implementation of agreements between Cambodia and Thailand. “ASEAN under the Philippines had discussed development of implementation of all agreements between Cambodia and Thailand,” Bona said.

He added that Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhonn had briefed ASEAN members on developments. “The Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhonn has informed all ASEAN members about the situations between Cambodia and Thailand, how the problems evolved and some issues about refugees,” he said.

Bona said Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro confirmed Manila’s role in implementing the joint declaration. “She confirmed that she is prepared to facilitate and monitor the December 27, 2025 joint declaration to be effective,” he said, adding that “the Philippines has also taken the chairmanship of the AOT from Malaysia”.

Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship: Restraint over reform in a year of crises

How did Malaysia set the scene for the Philippines ASEAN chair and deal with the range of challenges?

Qistina Nadia Dzulqarnain 

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia: Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN last year unfolded amid intensifying great-power rivalry, the Myanmar crisis, South China Sea disputes, and economic uncertainty – a convergence that pushed Kuala Lumpur toward crisis containment rather than ambitious reform.


Within such constraints, however, analysts argue Malaysia performed credibly, particularly in keeping ASEAN-led mechanisms functional – the ASEAN Regional Forum remained active, and Malaysia successfully mediated the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute.

‘Diplomatic prowess’


For Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) analyst Izzah Khairina Ibrahim, Malaysia’s chairmanship was a case study in diplomatic prowess and regional leadership. 


The large turnout at the ASEAN Summit, she said, reflected not only Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s personal diplomacy, but also Malaysia’s long-standing, principled and non-aligned foreign policy shaped by its dependence on external market access and global stability.


This approach translated into initiatives that strengthened geo-economic diversification, particularly the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Myanmar 5PC ‘ineffective’


While Malaysia maintained restraint on the South China Sea issue, preventing deeper internal division, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman’s assistant professor of international relations Liew Wui Chern saw ASEAN’s role in managing the Myanmar crisis as “diplomatic, albeit with limited impact”. 


He highlighted that the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC) remained ineffective in tackling deeper concerns, with the bloc continuing to release declaratory statements while lacking enforcement mechanisms.


Izzah noted that the lack of such mechanisms, coupled with consensus-based decision-making, limited more decisive action, raising broader concerns about ASEAN’s cohesion and effectiveness.


Manila now assumes the chairmanship, inheriting these same structural constraints alongside mounting geopolitical pressures.


The unresolved Myanmar crisis remains a central challenge, with continued political instability and little prospect of meaningful progress under existing mechanisms.


South China Sea tensions are expected to weigh even more heavily on the agenda, particularly as Manila–Beijing relations deteriorate.

Minilateral security groupings muddy the waters


Complicating the landscape further is the growing prominence of minilateral security groupings – Bangkok, Manila, and Singapore have strengthened ties with the United States, while Cambodia has aligned more closely with China. These pressures test ASEAN’s internal unity and challenge the long-standing neutrality of members like Malaysia and Singapore as divergent alignments deepen.


Liew warned that Manila may be tempted to elevate ASEAN on the global stage, especially on the South China Sea issue, but over-politicisation risks splitting the bloc internally.


Malaysia’s experience, he argued, showed that “trying to do less can sometimes preserve more”. ASEAN works best as a stabiliser – one that maintains dialogue and manages expectations – rather than a resolver of disputes.


Izzah offered similar counsel: the Philippines should build on, rather than sideline, the work of previous chairs – particularly the progress made through the Malaysian special envoy on Myanmar.


The Philippines could also leverage individual members’ strengths in managing extra-regional powers and potential crises, she argued, as complements to existing regional mechanisms.


The difficulties in securing a ceasefire despite the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord, she added, serve as a reminder that matters of strategic importance cannot be avoided for fear of national sensitivities.

This is Part 2 of a two-part assessment of ASEAN’s challenges for 2026 by Southeast Asian newsrooms for Mizzima, Rappler, Kiripost and Malaysiakini.

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