Rappler-Mizzima
ASEAN newsrooms have joined together here to provide an initial assessment of the progress and challenges faced by ASEAN in 2026 under the chair of the Philippines.
In the following article, published in two parts, regional newsrooms Rappler, Mizzima, Kiripost, and Malaysiakini delve into the key issues facing this regional body.
Philippines takes ASEAN helm amid stormy seas
Tensions and crises within and beyond ASEAN are rivaled in intensity by a flood control corruption scandal that Philippine President Marcos is trying to manage at home
By BEA CUPIN*
CEBU, Philippines – Throughout 2024, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made variations of a similar pitch: that in a world of two superpowers trying to one-up each other, middle powers should come together against common threats to make sure they’re the “main characters in our collective story.”
Marcos’ aspirations will have to come into practice in 2026, with the Philippines acting as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Manila has introduced “three Ps” as its priorities — “Peace and Security Anchors, Prosperity Corridors, and People Empowerment.”
The archipelagic nation’s aspirations are painted all over ASEAN 2026’s visual branding. Its logo is that of a balangay, a pre-colonial boat used to travel across the archipelago that would eventually constitute the Philippines.
The mighty balangay was also once used to traverse open sea and trade in faraway islands and coasts long before modern-day borders were drawn up. The ASEAN chairship’s theme is not subtle either: “Navigating Our Future, Together.”
With the abundance of maritime references, one wonders: what kind of rough waters will Marcos and the Philippines need to steer the bloc through?
Security takes spotlight
The Philippines kicked off its chairmanship in Cebu province, home to over 5.2 million people. As the most vote-rich province in the country with a long history of pre-colonial and modern-day trade, Cebu is a hub of both political power and trade.
The gathering of ASEAN’s foreign ministers is the first high-level meeting in the Philippines’ chairmanship and the first major meeting under the ASEAN Political-Security Community.
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) officials had laid out priority discussions for the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) — the implementation of the 5-point consensus on Myanmar, border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, and tensions and disputes in the South China Sea.
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary and AMM chair Maria Theresa Lazaro said in a press statement, the global environment ASEAN faces “is marked by overlapping pressures, including intensifying geopolitical competition, growing economic uncertainty, and the erosion of multilateral systems and the rules-based order through unilateral actions.”
In other words, the world ASEAN exists in is in flux.
As China deepens its influence in the bloc and beyond, the United States has become more brazen in flouting rules that middle powers try to uphold.
Lazaro added: “Taken together, these realities underscore the enduring importance of ASEAN’s time-honored principles of restraint, dialogue, and adherence to international law in seeking to preserve peace and stability for our peoples.”
After the retreat on January 29 that took over four hours and a January 28 huddle on the 5-point consensus, ASEAN could not yet make a stand on the elections in Myanmar days after the third voting round in the junta-ruled country concluded.
Lazaro said the bloc wants a solution that is “both Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led, while reaffirming that Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN.”
Hope in a Code of Conduct?
Among Manila’s loftier aspirations is the elusive conclusion of the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea between ASEAN and China. 2026 is the deadline foreign ministers set in 2023 for the conclusion of rules the bloc and China would follow to avoid clashes, lower tensions, and bring stability to the key waterway.
Negotiations have stretched for two decades, since the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed in 2002. Its pace has been exceedingly slow — with the first breakthrough being a Single Draft Negotiating Text agreed upon in 2018, or 16 years after the DOC.
It was not until 2025 that negotiators began deliberating on milestone issues, or the most contentious points in talks.
Manila wants an even faster pace in 2026.
Lazaro said face-to-face meetings between ASEAN and China on the COC are set to happen monthly. Diplomats say there’s willingness to hold even online meetings to hasten progress in negotiations.
But meeting frequency does not always ensure that difficult topics will be resolved faster.
The four milestone issues include the scope of the COC, definitions including self-restraint and rules covering joint military drills, the new text’s relation to the DOC, and whether it will be legally binding.
Lazaro disclosed a focus of the Philippines: the definition of self-restraint and the “possible terms of reference of that issue.”
Consensus is a core principle that’s helped maintain ASEAN cohesion while making it difficult for the bloc to make bold declarations.
ASEAN members are diverse in how they view South China Sea issues and their relationships with China. Differing national interests explain, in part, why negotiating a COC in a consensus-based bloc has been so difficult.
While the South China Sea is a constant talking point in ASEAN, rarely is consensus found in these discussions.
The stakes for the Philippines are especially high.
China’s sweeping claim in the South China Sea has translated into restrictions on, and harassment of, Filipino fisherfolk in some fishing areas. For local communities that are among the poorest in the country, this means fishing in less abundant waters or venturing farther into open sea.
For Philippine government vessels, it has meant repeatedly facing dangerous acts by the China Coast Guard — like strong water cannons while at sea — to drive them away from waters Beijing considers its territory.
ASEAN and its member-states have been noticeably quiet in the face of clashes between Manila and Beijing in the West Philippine Sea — a portion of the South China Sea that includes the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and its claimed features.
President Marcos has repeatedly raised South China Sea issues in ASEAN summits.
In 2024 at Vientiane, Marcos urged the bloc “not to turn a blind eye to the aggressive, coercive, and illegal actions of an external power against an ASEAN member state for such actions undermine their claims of genuine adherence to our core values.”
Marcos warned that “silence in the face of these violations diminishes ASEAN.” According to Nikkei reporting, co-claimants “Vietnam, Singapore and Thailand followed Marcos’ lead and brought up their South China Sea concerns” at the ASEAN-China Summit, where geopolitical issues are typically not raised.
Will Marcos and the Philippines be as bold in 2026? After all, in 2024, Marcos said the “onus is now on China” to hasten talks since “ASEAN has been waiting for a long time.”
Challenge at home
As the Philippines plans and hosts 650 or so meetings across the year, including the 48th and 49th Summit, Marcos must also deal with an existential crisis at home.
The flood control corruption he exposed has caused his trust and approval numbers to plunge, with over two years still left in his presidency.
There’s concern in the bureaucracy and diplomatic circles that the resulting mess could suck oxygen from domestic governance and waste the opportunities an ASEAN chairmanship offers.
The week before Cebu’s hosting of the AMM and the ASEAN Tourism Forum (ATF), impeachment cases were filed against Marcos. The same week, he announced a diverticulitis diagnosis, which meant he had to cut down on public engagements, including the ATF kickoff.
If 2025 was rough seas for Marcos as president and politician, 2026 has early indications of even stormier conditions.
Can Marcos and the Philippines effectively steer and navigate the bloc’s future in one piece?
*Bea Cupin is a multimedia reporter who covers foreign affairs, defense, and politics for Manila-based news website Rappler.
Myanmar’s opposition fears ASEAN betrayal
The Philippines envoy’s first steps may have raised eyebrows, but she appears to have moved quickly to engage opposition figures as part of a plan to tackle the Myanmar crisis.
By SRI, Mizzima Correspondent*
CHIANG MAI, Thailand: ASEAN has struggled over the last five years to respond to the Myanmar crisis following the February 1, 2021 military coup. It was therefore no surprise that 99 civil society organizations (CSOs) penned a protest letter to the regional body following the January 6 visit of the then newly-appointed Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar for 2026 Philippines Foreign Minister Maria Theresa Lazaro to Naypyidaw to shake hands with Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and hold discussions.
ASEAN’s new chair has a lot on its plate, not least the standoff in the South China Sea, and the tensions between Thailand and Cambodia. But the Myanmar crisis and ASEAN’s adherence to the 5-Point Consensus (5PC) continue to prove a hard nut to crack.
The Myanmar opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and a range of opposition players and CSOs are seeking reassurance from ASEAN – whose performance is considered mixed if best over the last five years – that they will not recognize the Myanmar junta’s recent three-phase national election and offer the resulting administration any shred of legitimacy.
Military-proxy party wins election
In December and January, the military-proxy Union and Solidarity Development Party (USDP) won the majority of seats in an election that saw a poor voter turnout, far lower than the 54 percent claimed by the junta – and minus the jailed National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her party.
Lost in the verbiage of a recent ASEAN foreign ministers’ statement January 29, following a meeting in Cebu, was a direct reference to any outright ASEAN rejection of the Myanmar junta election. Instead, the emphasis of the statement was placed on the largely discredited 5PC that the junta has largely ignored. In addition, a representative from Myanmar was invited to attend the Cebu meeting.
The Philippines’ foreign minister told reporters that ASEAN members did not go as far as endorsing Myanmar’s junta-run elections, but “a good number” of the 11 nations agreed that “these elections might be something positive”.
The ASEAN statement included the following: “We had candid discussions on the evolving developments in Myanmar and reaffirmed our commitment to advancing the implementation of the 5PC. We noted that any meaningful political progress can only take place in an environment of peace, security, and inclusivity, supported by the cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue among all relevant stakeholders. We reiterated our united position that the 5PC remains our primary reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar and further affirmed the corresponding Leaders’ decisions. We emphasised ASEAN’s commitment and role to assist Myanmar in charting a future and a peaceful and lasting solution to the crisis which is both Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led, while reaffirming that Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN. We reaffirmed ASEAN’s position on the importance of free, fair, peaceful, transparent, inclusive, and credible general elections in Myanmar. We noted the conclusion of the three phases of the general elections.”
ASEAN envoy action
Khin Ohmar of NGO Progressive Voice said she was initially worried about Philippine Foreign Minister Lazaro’s visit to Myanmar on January 6 “because she went during the period of the military junta’s sham election. We were afraid that the military junta would use this for big propaganda and take credit. Indeed, the military junta did use it [in this way].” But the ASEAN envoy has moved quickly to engage with a number of Myanmar opposition figures behind closed doors since her Naypyidaw visit, she noted.
That said, Khin Ohmar, who was involved in Myanmar’s 1988 democracy uprising, is concerned that ASEAN has failed to secure any of the points of the body’s 5PC.
“If they think they can just have the military and the revolutionary side meet, drink tea or coffee, and everything will be fine, then they don’t understand Myanmar’s political history or real ‘positive peace.’ Just stopping the shooting for a few months is not a real or sustainable solution; that is what we call ‘negative peace,’” she said.
“What we in the revolution are trying to do is to remove and abolish the military institution – the structure that teaches people to kill, rob, and rape. If we just go and talk to this group of people, including Min Aung Hlaing, without holding them accountable or punishing them through the law, the person talking to them would be a fool. People in the revolution are not that politically weak. So, there is no reason for the revolution side to talk to the terrorist military,” Khin Ohmar added.
Opposition NUG seeks solution
Nay Phone Latt, spokesperson for the opposition NUG Prime Minister’s Office, told Mizzima that he hoped ASEAN would not accept the result of the Myanmar military junta’s national poll and offer any form of legitimacy to the resulting administration.
“From what we understand now, in the [ASEAN] statement … we do not see a sense of recognizing this ‘Sham Election.’ We only see that they have ‘noted’ that it was carried out. We haven’t seen them release anything that recognizes it. So, it must be said that ASEAN does not recognize this illegal election. I understand the concept in that way. To be honest, we have always requested this. Because nothing will change. The USDP is also a party dominated only by people from the military. So, it is just military people changing their uniforms, taking the form of a party, and trying to make military rule in Myanmar last longer by changing it into another form,” he said.
The NUG spokesperson recognizes that some ASEAN countries may be more willing to accept the outcome of the Myanmar election as “there are some individual countries within ASEAN that are very friendly with the military”. But “this does not align with the will of the people”.
Nay Phone Latt predicts that junta leader “Min Aung Hlaing will take the President position that will come from the USDP. So, it seems Min Aung Hlaing himself will continue to rule the country. Therefore, as long as Min Aung Hlaing is ruling, there is no reason for this country to get better. I analyze that it will only get worse.”
Fears about offering legitimacy
Many Myanmar NGO activists are concerned about ASEAN pushing a solution that includes the military junta, as evidenced by the CSO protest letter signed by 99 organizations.
Activist Mulan with NGO Blood Money Campaign told Mizzima that ASEAN continues to push for a solution through negotiation and discussion involving all stakeholders.
“To put it simply, the situation is that they will continue to push the NUG, NUCC [National Unity Consultative Council], federal units, and EROs [Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations] to have a dialogue with the terrorist military junta,” she said. “While they are telling the military junta to follow the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus to stop the violence, on the other hand, ASEAN countries like the governments and companies of Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand are fully helping from behind the scenes with the supply chains for finances, weapons, technology, and aviation fuel so that the military junta can carry out terrorist bombings.”
Actions matter more than words. “During these five years, both ASEAN leaders and Lazaro have frequently used the word ‘peace’ for Myanmar, but their way of approaching the terrorist military junta is wrong,” said Mulan. “If they really want to solve Myanmar’s affairs, the approach of meeting, talking, shaking hands, and issuing statements – without doing a single thing that can take action against the terrorist military junta, whether as a group of ASEAN leaders or individually by country – this does not work at all. The military junta will, of course, be happy. They can kill people as they like, and when the time comes, ASEAN leaders still come to meet them one after another. By frequently using the word ‘diplomacy,’ ASEAN itself is supporting and encouraging the violence.”
Unity viewed as lacking
NUG spokesperson Nay Phone Latt noted that part of the challenge for the Myanmar opposition groups when attempting to interact with ASEAN is their diversity and lack of cohesion of the players.
“We are working with a focus on making cooperation stronger in both military and political ways,” Nay Phone Latt said. “In military terms, the Joint Command – the PDFs under the NUG, the EROs, and alliances like the SRA (Spring Revolution Alliance) – we are trying to work so that all these groups are not fighting separately, but fighting and carrying out military operations under a Joint Command. On the other side, we are also consulting to form a stronger leadership group in political terms. We are trying very hard for something to emerge within this year.”
He recognizes a stronger sense of resistance unity is needed to make it easier for ASEAN to engage with the voices of the Myanmar people who are seeking “system change” and not “regime change”.
*SRI is a Mizzima multimedia correspondent who covers Myanmar and regional affairs.
Part Two of this joint ASEAN assessment will be published tomorrow.
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