"The Waning of Myanmar’s Sovereignty" A Geopolitical Analysis of Post‑2021 Dependence on China

By Maung Maung Myint

Abstract

Following the attempted coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s foreign policy posture has undergone a radical transformation. A country that historically practiced Non‑alignment and Strategic Hedging has now veered toward Asymmetric Dependency on the People’s Republic of China under the State Security and Peace Commission (formerly the State Administration Council). This article argues that Myanmar is transitioning from a “Hedging State” to a “Client State,” resembling the contemporary Russia–Belarus model. This shift is driven not by political doctrine but by the military regime’s need for survival. China is exploiting this vulnerability to secure critical geostrategic assets—including access to the Indian Ocean to mitigate its “Malacca Dilemma.”

1. Introduction: The Failure of Strategic Hedging

For 63 of the 78 years since independence, Myanmar has been ruled by military governments or military‑backed administrations. Throughout this period, these governments rigidly adhered to a non‑aligned foreign policy to avoid becoming a pawn in superpower competition.

The “Open Door Policy” pursued between 2011 and 2021 represented a strategic effort to reduce the Chinese influence that had taken root during the earlier SPDC/SLORC era. It expanded international economic partnerships and improved relations with the West, ASEAN, and other Asian nations, thereby moderately reducing Myanmar’s political and economic reliance on China.

However, the 2021 coup dismantled this architecture. Due to Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the military regime has been forced to adopt a Single‑vector Foreign Policy. Facing a crisis caused by economic restrictions and arms embargoes, the regime has made concessions it previously refused in order to secure China’s economic support and political protection. Unlike the “Burmese Way to Socialism” era—when isolation was voluntary—post‑2021 Myanmar has reached a point where it must rely on China in a manner resembling a vassal state.

2. Comparative Analysis: The Nature of the “Pariah and the Patron”

To understand Myanmar’s current trajectory, it is useful to compare it with contemporary examples of “Autocratic Survivalism.” The most distinct parallel is the relationship between Belarus and the Russian Federation after the disputed 2020 Belarusian elections.

Much like President Alexander Lukashenko, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing faces two crises: a lack of domestic legitimacy and widespread international condemnation. In both cases, the dictators sacrificed national sovereignty for regime survival. Just as Belarus entered Russia’s security umbrella to withstand Western pressure, Myanmar is being absorbed into China’s geo‑economic sphere.

This phenomenon differs from the concept of a “Buffer State.” While North Korea serves as a buffer for China against U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang possesses the leverage to apply counter‑pressure due to its nuclear arsenal. The Myanmar military regime possesses no such capability.

As a result, its relationship with China is defined by coercion and subservience. The fact that the Chinese government is permitted to mediate Myanmar’s internal conflicts—such as the Northern Shan State ceasefire—demonstrates the visible erosion of Myanmar’s sovereignty.

3. Geoeconomic Drivers: China’s Malacca Dilemma

China’s support for the military regime is not rooted in diplomatic goodwill but in Realpolitik—specifically, the need to mitigate its “Malacca Dilemma.” As China relies heavily on the Strait of Malacca for energy imports, it faces the risk of disruption should this maritime route be blockaded.

Myanmar offers China a strategic foothold connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The key projects in this calculus include:

• Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port: A terminal in Rakhine State providing direct access to the Indian Ocean.
• China–Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines: Routes capable of transporting energy directly to Yunnan Province.
• China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC): An infrastructure network linking Myanmar’s economy with Southwest China.

Additionally, although not part of the main group, the Myitsone Dam—which could supply electricity to Yunnan and surrounding provinces—remains a significant Chinese interest.

These projects are indispensable to China. Yet Beijing increasingly views the Myanmar military as a high‑risk partner due to its inability to control the civil war. Consequently, China has sought guarantees from all sides by maintaining relations with Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) along the border.

4. Domestic Implications: The “Pauk‑Phaw” Trap

While the term “Pauk‑Phaw” (fraternal) has long been used in Sino‑Myanmar relations, in the post‑coup era it has become a trap.

The military regime has entered a cycle of debt and dependency. Prioritizing regime survival, it has accelerated Chinese projects that are fiercely opposed by local communities—contradicting the very nationalism the military claims to defend. As a result, the country has devolved into a “Zombie Client State.” This term implies that while the regime claims to possess sovereignty, it lacks de facto agency and decision‑making power, relying on external economic support to operate a war machine rejected by the population.

5. Strategic Options for Resistance Organizations

The deep anti‑China sentiment among the Myanmar public—stemming from Beijing’s multi‑faceted support for the military forces terrorizing the population—presents a strategic dilemma for the National Unity Government (NUG) and allied resistance forces.

On one hand, treating China as an adversary may reflect public sentiment but risks driving Beijing to increase support for the junta. On the other hand, engaging warmly with China risks public anger and a loss of revolutionary momentum.

In this context, the pragmatic counter‑strategy can be described as “Redefined Alignment.” The NUG has repeatedly informed the Chinese government that a democratic, future federal Myanmar would be a more reliable guarantor of Chinese assets than the unstable military regime. Through diplomatic channels, the NUG and resistance forces have expressed their commitment to honoring legitimate treaties, stabilizing the border, and combating transnational crimes such as “Kyar Phant” (online scams). In practice, they have avoided attacks on Chinese interests within their territories. Politically, they have also declared acceptance of China’s “One China Policy.”

Nevertheless, China continues to support the Myanmar military.

6. Conclusion

Myanmar’s slide toward Satellite State status is not an inevitable historical outcome but a direct consequence of the military’s miscalculation in 2021. The coup destroyed the country’s capacity to balance between great powers. As the military’s dominance persists, there is a growing danger that Myanmar will become a permanent political subordinate to China, with its sovereignty reduced to a nominal status.

Although pro‑democracy resistance forces are attempting to demonstrate that they are more reliable partners for regional powers than the military regime, these efforts have yet to bear fruit. At the same time, it is neither possible nor appropriate for the resistance movement to offer China greater economic or strategic concessions than the junta, given the country’s destitute condition.

The only viable exit from the crisis caused by the military coup is for all resistance organizations and the majority of citizens to intensify their efforts to end military rule and establish a stable Federal Union. Only then can Myanmar reclaim genuine sovereignty and engage with all nations—including its powerful neighbors—on equal terms.